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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Much attention has recently been focused on fraud committed by business 
executives and on the accounting firms that failed to detect and report financial statement 
fraud.  This failure has resulted in a loss of public confidence in audited financial 
statements and created an environment where users of financial statements are 
questioning the procedures utilized to detect financial statement fraud.
Prior to the recent accounting scandals, the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants’ (AICPA) Fraud Task Force directed the Accounting Standards Board 
(ASB) to consider revising Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 82, “Consideration 
of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit.”  This was based on academic research, 
recommendations from the accounting profession, and recommendations provided by 
other financial reporting stakeholders.  This process as well as other pressures resulted in 
the issuance of SAS No. 99, “Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit” 
(which supersedes SAS No. 82).  While the auditor’s responsibility for detecting fraud 
remains unchanged, SAS No. 99 is intended to focus auditing guidance and thus increase 
auditor effectiveness in detecting fraud. 
SAS No. 99 describes a process wherein the auditor (1) gathers information 
needed to identify risks of material misstatement, (2) assesses these risks after taking into 
account an evaluation of the entity’s programs and controls, and (3) responds to the 
results. Under SAS No. 99, the auditor must gather and consider much more information
2to assess fraud risks than in the past (Ramos 2003).  This process involves gathering 
information and assessing firms’ “fraud risk factors.”
The theory behind the SAS No. 99 fraud risk factors was developed by Donald R. 
Cressey in the late 1940s.  Cressey surmised that three conditions are present when fraud 
occurs: 
1. Pressure – management or other employees may have an incentive or be under 
pressure, which provides a motivation to commit fraud.
2. Opportunity – circumstances exist (i.e., the absence of controls, ineffective 
controls, or the ability of management to override controls) that provide an 
opportunity for fraud to be perpetrated. 
3. Rationalization – those involved in a fraud rationalize a fraudulent act as 
being consistent with their personal code of ethics.  Some individuals possess 
an attitude, a character and/or a set of ethical values that allow them to 
knowingly and intentionally commit a dishonest act (Ramos 2003). 
Over the years, these three conditions of fraud have been referred to as the “fraud 
triangle.”
The purpose of this study was to empirically examine the fraud risk factors 
adopted in SAS No. 99.  Empirical explanation of the fraud risk factors is important since 
it sheds light on the validity of the AICPA’s adoption of Cressey’s fraud triangle theory 
in the detection of financial statement fraud.  Further, a fraud prediction model was 
developed using the empirically valid fraud risk factors.  It is important to note that this 
model is intended to provide users of publicly available information with a fraud 
3prediction model.  This model is not intended for those with proprietary information (i.e., 
auditors).
The first phase of testing involved identifying and testing proxies for pressure, 
opportunity, and rationalization.  These proxies were examined for a sample of firms that 
have been convicted of fraud and compared with a sample of no-fraud firms.  The second 
phase, in the same spirit as the bankruptcy prediction studies (initiated by Altman 1968), 
involved using the empirically relevant fraud risk factors identified in the first phase to 
develop a fraud prediction model. 
The results of this study are of interest to academics, standard setters, and users of 
financial statement data.  If Cressey’s theory is correct, then the use of the SAS No. 99
fraud risk factors may increase confidence in audited financial statements.  A fraud 
prediction model is of interest to academics, standard setters, and users of financial 
statement data since it permits the use of publicly available data (unlike the proprietary 
data that auditors and other insiders may have access to) to assess the likelihood that a 
firm will be involved in the preparation of fraudulent financial statements (similar to 
Altman’s Z-score [1968]).
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 discusses 
the relevant literature and empirical predictions.  Chapter 3 introduces the sample 
selection and research design.  Chapter 4 presents the empirical results and Chapter 5 
offers concluding remarks and limitations of the study.
4CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Definition of fraud
The primary definition of fraud used by practitioners comes from the Association 
of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE). The ACFE defines financial statement fraud in 
terms of managerial intent:
Financial statement fraud is the deliberate misrepresentation of the financial 
condition of an enterprise accomplished through the intentional misstatement or 
omission of amounts or disclosures in the financial statements to deceive financial 
statement users. (ACFE 2003)
In this study, a fraud firm is a firm that has been identified by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) as having issued financial statements that are in violation 
of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) or involved in an alleged violation 
of Rule 10(b)-5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act or Section 17(a) of the 1933 
Securities Act.  These provisions represent the primary antifraud provisions related to 
financial reporting.  It is important to note that it was not until the issuance of SAS No. 82
that an authoritative body defined fraud.  SAS No. 82 defined fraud on the basis of 
whether the underlying action that resulted in a misstatement of the financial statements 
was intentional or unintentional.
SAS No. 82 made it clear that in order to be considered fraud the following 
elements must be evident: a false representation of fact; knowledge that the 
representation was false; intent to induce another to act; justifiable reliance on the
5representation; and injury resulting from such reliance.  SAS No. 82 also points out two 
types of misstatements relevant to an auditor’s responsibility: 
1. Misstatements arising from fraudulent financial reporting, i.e., those involving 
intentional misstatements or omissions of amounts or disclosures in the 
financial statements. 
2. Misappropriation of assets, i.e., situations involving the theft of an entity’s 
assets, accompanied by financial statement misrepresentation.
SAS No. 99
In 2002, the AICPA issued SAS No. 99.  Although SAS No. 99 supersedes SAS No. 
82, it does not change an auditor’s responsibility to detect fraud.  In fact, SAS No. 99
provides new concepts, requirements, and guidance to assist auditors in fulfilling their 
current responsibility to detect fraud.  SAS No. 99 requires auditors to: 1) discuss the risks 
of material misstatement due to fraud among engagement personnel; 2) query 
management on its views of the risks of fraud in the entity and its knowledge of any 
known or suspected fraud; 3) broaden, beyond the factors provided in SAS No. 82, the 
range of information the auditor uses to assess the risks of material misstatement due to 
fraud; 4) consider management’s programs and controls to address risks and determine 
whether such programs and controls will mitigate or exacerbate the identified risks; and 
5) develop an appropriate response for each fraud risk identified (Montgomery et al. 
2002). 
When considering fraud, SAS No. 99 notes that “because fraud is usually 
concealed, material misstatements are difficult to detect.  Nevertheless, the auditor may 
identify events or conditions that indicate incentives/pressures to perpetrate fraud, 
6opportunities to carry out the fraud, or attitudes/rationalizations to justify a fraudulent 
action” (SAS No. 99 para. 31).  These events or conditions are referred to as fraud risk 
factors.  SAS No. 99 observes that the existence of such risk factors does not necessarily 
indicate the occurrence or existence of fraud; however, these factors are often present in 
the circumstances where fraud exists.
Fraud Risk Factors
The theory behind the fraud risk factors was first introduced by Donald R. 
Cressey in his work Other People’s Money: A Study in the Social Psychology of 
Embezzlement (1953).  Cressey interviewed approximately 200 individuals who had been 
incarcerated for embezzling funds.  Through this process he determined that the frauds 
appeared to have three key common elements.  First, the embezzler had the opportunity 
to perpetrate fraud.  Second, there was a perceived non-shareable financial need 
(pressure).  Third, the fraudster had the ability to rationalize the fraud.  Figure 1 
illustrates these three key common elements, which are better known as the “fraud 
triangle.” 
7FIGURE 1
FRAUD TRIANGLE
It is important to note that Cressey argued that each element of the fraud triangle 
will exist in a given fraud, while SAS No. 99 suggests that only one element of the fraud 
triangle needs to be present for a fraud to potentially occur.  SAS No. 99 provides 
examples of potential fraud risk factors that the auditor may discover.  These risk factors 
are categorized into the three categories of the fraud triangle.  Figure 2 provides a 
summary of the SAS No. 99 fraud risk factors by category. 
FRAUD
TRIANGLE
Opportunity
Pressure Rationalization
8FIGURE 2
EXAMPLES OF FRAUD RISK FACTORS FROM SAS NO. 99 
RELATING TO FINANCIAL STATEMENT MISSTATEMENTS1
Pressures Opportunities Rationalizations
1. Financial stability or 
profitability is threatened by 
economic, industry, or entity 
operating conditions: 
•High degree of competition or 
declining profit margins 
•High vulnerability to rapid 
changes (i.e., technology, 
obsolescence, or interest rates)
•Declines in customer demand
•Operating losses 
•Recurring negative cash flows 
from operations 
•Rapid growth or unusual 
profitability
•New accounting, statutory, or 
regulatory requirements
2. Excessive pressure exists for 
management to meet 
requirements of third parties: 
•Profitability/trend expectations
•Need to obtain additional debt 
or equity financing 
•Marginal ability to meet
exchange listing requirements 
or debt repayment or other debt 
covenant requirements 
•Likely poor financial results on 
significant pending 
transactions.
3.  Management or directors’ 
personal financial situation is: 
•Significant financial interests in 
the entity 
•Significant performance based 
compensation 
•Personal guarantees of debts 
4. There is excessive pressure 
on management or operating 
personnel to meet financial 
targets set up by directors or 
management.
1. Industry provides 
opportunities for 
•Related-party transactions 
beyond ordinary
•A strong financial presence or 
ability to dominate a certain 
industry sector that allows the 
entity to dictate terms or 
conditions to suppliers or 
customers
•Accounts based on significant 
estimates
•Significant, unusual, or highly 
complex transactions
•Significant operations across 
international borders 
environments and cultures
•Significant bank accounts in 
tax-haven jurisdictions 
2. Ineffective monitoring of 
management allows 
•Domination of management by 
a single person or small group
•Ineffective board of directors 
or audit committee oversight 
3. There is a complex or 
unstable organizational 
structure 
•Difficulty in determining the 
organization or individuals that 
have control of company 
•Overly complex structure
•High turnover of senior 
management, counsel, or board 
4. Internal control deficient
•Inadequate monitoring of 
controls
•High turnover rates or 
employment of ineffective 
accounting, internal audit, or 
information technology staff
•Ineffective accounting and 
information systems.
1. Attitudes/rationalizations by 
board members, management, 
or employees that allow them to 
engage in and/or justify 
fraudulent financial reporting
• Ineffective communication, 
implementation, support, or 
enforcement of ethics 
• Nonfinancial management's 
excessive participation in 
selection of accounting 
principles or the determining 
estimates 
• Known history of violations of 
securities laws or other laws 
• Excessive interest in 
maintaining or increasing stock 
price 
• Aggressive or unrealistic 
forecasts 
• Failure to correct known 
reportable conditions on a 
timely basis 
• Interest by management in 
employing inappropriate means 
to min. reported earnings for tax
• Recurring attempts by 
management to justify marginal 
or inappropriate accounting on 
the basis of materiality 
• Strained relationship with 
current or predecessor auditor 
o Frequent disputes with the 
current or predecessor 
auditor 
o Unreasonable demands on 
the auditor, such as 
unreasonable time constraints 
o Restrictions on the auditor 
that inappropriately limit 
access 
o Domineering management 
behavior in dealing with the 
auditor
1 From Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, Appendix: “Examples of 
Fraud Risk Factors.” Copyright © 2002 by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc., New York, New York
9Other Relevant Research
Historically, fraud research either focused on the detection of fraud or explanation 
of the factors leading to fraud.  Recently, earnings management research has begun to 
investigate fraud as an extension of earnings management.  These studies seek to 
determine whether fraudulent income-increasing tactics are motivated by factors similar 
to those that are associated with income-increasing GAAP accounting method choices.  
The following research examines factors that may explain fraud and are important in 
identifying potential proxies for the SAS No. 99 fraud risk factors.
Kinney and McDaniel (1989) authored an early study in this stream of research 
analyzing the characteristics of firms that reported corrections to previously issued 
interim financial statements.  These corrections did not necessarily imply the existence of 
fraud, although virtually all situations involved corrected overstated (rather than 
understated) earnings.  In fact, 14 percent of the firms were involved in lawsuits claiming 
that the financial statements from the corrected period had been fraudulently misstated.  
Kinney and McDaniel found that, consistent with earnings management motives, these 
firms are less profitable, have higher debt, and are slower growing than other firms in 
their industry.
DeChow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996) examined 92 firms subject to Accounting 
and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) issued by the SEC, comparing them to a 
matched sample of firms not subject to an AAER.  Specifically the study examined 1) the 
causes of earnings manipulations (i.e., debt hypothesis, bonus hypothesis, and political 
cost hypothesis), 2) governance characteristics related to opportunities to manipulate (i.e., 
Board of Directors and auditor characteristics), and 3) the consequences of manipulation 
10
(i.e., percent of shares shorted, dispersion of analysts’ forecasts, stock price changes).  
They found that the desire to obtain low-cost financing is a primary motivation for the 
commission of fraud through earnings manipulation.  Additionally, manipulating firms 
appear to have weaker governance systems and experience higher costs of capital once 
the fraud is revealed.
Beasley (1996) used logit analysis to test whether audit committees, board of 
director composition, and corporate governance affect the likelihood of financial 
statement fraud.  Using a matched-pair approach, he found that the presence of an audit 
committee does not significantly affect the likelihood of financial statement fraud.  He 
also found that the likelihood of financial statement fraud decreases as 1) outside director 
ownership in the firm and outside director tenure on the board increase and 2) as the 
number of outside directorships in other firms held by outside directors decreases.
Beneish (1997) presented a model to detect GAAP violation/earnings 
management among firms experiencing extreme financial performance, and compares the 
model’s performance to discretionary accrual models.  Beneish noted that total accruals 
divided by total assets, sales growth, and leverage were useful in identifying GAAP 
violators and aggressive accruers.  He noted that these variables means for GAAP 
violators and non-GAAP violators are statistically different at the ten percent (10%) 
level.  These variables are important since SAS No. 99 identifies aggressive/unusual 
accounting behavior as a potential indicator of financial statement fraud.
Summers and Sweeney (1998) investigated the relationship between insider 
trading and fraud.  They found that in the presence of fraud, insiders reduce their 
holdings of company stock through high levels of selling activity as measured by either 
11
the number of transactions, the number of shares sold, or the dollar amount of shares 
sold.  Further, using a logit model, Summers and Sweeney showed firm-specific financial 
statement variables, such as growth, inventory, and ROA, differ from companies with 
fraud and companies without fraud.
Abbott et al. (2002) examined audit committee characteristics identified by the 
Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) and evaluated the usefulness of these characteristics in 
identifying firms that have restated financial results with and without allegations of fraud.  
They found that the  independence of the audit committee and whether the audit 
committee meets four times per year exhibit significance and a negative association with 
the occurrence of financial reporting fraud.
Dunn (2004) examined the issues of corporate governance and insider power in 
relation to fraud.  He used logistic regression to examine the relationship between the top 
management team and board of directors’ characteristics with the release of fraudulent 
financial statements.  Dunn’s results show that fraud is more likely to occur when there is 
a concentration of power in the hands of insiders.  
The bankruptcy literature is important to the development of the fraud prediction 
model.  Altman (1968) was the first among many (i.e., Altman et al. 1977, Ohlson 1980, 
Platt and Platt 1991) to use ratio analysis models as part of analytical review procedures 
to assess the appropriateness of the “going concern” assumption.  Through the use of 
financial ratios and the use of logistic and multiple discriminant analysis (MDA),
bankruptcy prediction models were developed.  This stream of research has been of 
interest to academics, and users and preparers of financial statements since it permits the 
use of publicly available information in the prediction of firm bankruptcy.  
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Altman (1968) and Altman et al. (1977) use d MDA to develop bankruptcy 
prediction formulas.  These models classify data into discrete categories, and establish a 
boundary equation that maximizes discrimination between categories.  Later bankruptcy 
research by Ohlson (1980) and Aziz et al. (1988 and 1989) favored logit regression over 
discriminant analysis.  This preference resulted from logit regression requiring less 
restrictive statistical assumptions than MDA.  Studies contrasting MDA and logit 
prediction models have found there to be no significant difference in accuracy between 
MDA and logit analysis (Cormier et al. 1995 and Allen and Chung 1998).
Following the bankruptcy literature, two studies (Person 1995 and Kaminski et al.
2004) sought to develop models based upon financial ratios to predict fraud.  Person used 
a stepwise logistic approach and Kaminski et al. used MDA.  Both models reported 
significant misclassification of fraud firms (between 58 and 98 percent).  However,
several financial ratio variables were shown to be useful in identifying and classifying 
fraud firms.  These financial ratios include fixed assets divided by total assets, inventory 
divided by sales, inventory divided by current assets, sales divided by accounts 
receivable, and sales divided by total assets.
Empirical Predictions
Using the fraud triangle theory developed by Donald R. Cressey and adopted by 
the AICPA in SAS No. 99, this study first analyzed the relationship between the SAS No. 
99 fraud risk factors and financial statement fraud.  Second, using the empirically valid 
fraud risk factors, this study developed a fraud prediction model.  The following 
empirical predictions (EP) were examined to determine the usefulness of the fraud risk 
factors in explaining and predicting financial statement fraud.
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EP1: The SAS No. 99 fraud risk factors are useful in explaining financial 
statement fraud.
EP2: Using the significant fraud risk factors (identified in EP1) it is possible to 
develop a model for predicting financial statement fraud.
This study extends the research literature by empirically examining the role of 
pressure, opportunity, and rationalization in detecting and predicting fraud.  The 
following chapter introduces the sample selection and research design.
14
CHAPTER III
SAMPLE SELECTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Sample Selection
The sample was limited to public companies since this study used information in 
financial statements and proxy statements filed with the SEC.  Fraud firms were 
identified from the SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs).  
AAERs issued between January 1992 and December 2001 were examined for firms with 
alleged violation of Rule 10(b)-5 of the 1934 Securities Act or Section 17(a) of the 1933 
Securities Act.  A firm was included in the sample if its proxy and financial statement 
data filed with the SEC was available in the fraud year and the two years preceding the 
fraud.  The proxy data was hand collected from the LexisNexis SEC Filings & Reports 
website and the 10K Wizard Database.  The financial statement data was collected from 
the COMPUSTAT database.  In most cases the actual fraud event was identified several 
years subsequent to the fraud.  Therefore, the study does not look at firms beyond 2001 to 
allow for firms that may still be identified as fraud firms.  Table 1 summarizes the 
identification of the fraud firms.
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TABLE 1
SELECTION OF FRAUD FIRMS
Total Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) 
firms identified with violation of Rule 10(b)-5 of the 1934 
Securities Act or Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act 120
Criteria for exclusion:
AAERs related to firms with no available proxy or financial 
statement data (e.g. small cap firms not required to file proxy 
statement information or immaterial subsidiary of larger 
corporation) (27)
AAERs outside of the test period (fraud occurrence prior to 1992) (5)
AAERs related to regulated industries (2)
Total fraud firms included in sample 86
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To create a comparison group (matched sample), no-fraud firms were identified 
that were similar to the fraud firms in size, industry, and time period.  Each fraud firm 
was matched with a no-fraud firm based on the following requirements:
1. Firm Size.  A no-fraud firm was considered similar to a fraud firm if its 
total assets, per COMPUSTAT, were within +/- 30 percent of the total 
assets for the fraud firm in the year preceding the fraud year.  If no 
matches were found, a no-fraud firm was considered similar if total sales 
were within +/- 30 percent of the fraud firm in the year preceding the fraud 
year (Beasley 1996);
2. Industry.  All firms in step 1 were reviewed to identify a no-fraud firm 
within the same four-digit SIC code as the fraud firm.  The no-fraud firm 
selected was the one that had a total assets or total sales value closest to 
the fraud firm’s total assets or total sales value.  If no four-digit SIC code 
firm match was identified, the procedure was performed to identify a firm 
with the same three-digit SIC code.  And if no three- digit SIC code firm 
match was identified, the procedure was performed to identify a firm with 
the same two-digit SIC code;
3. Time Period.  A no-fraud firm identified in steps 1 and 2 was included in 
the final sample if proxy and financial statement data were available for 
the time period used to collect data from the proxy and financial 
statements of the related firm.
17
The sample selection process identified 86 fraud firms individually matched with 
a no-fraud firm, creating a matched sample of 172 firms.  Table 2 shows that the fraud 
and no-fraud firms do not differ significantly based on total assets and net sales.  
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TABLE 2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND MATCHING OF FRAUD FIRMS 
AND NO-FRAUD FIRMS
($ in hundreds of thousands)
Fraud Firms No-Fraud Firms
Mean Mean
[Median] [Median]
(Standard Deviation) (Standard Deviation)
Total Assets 1,420.10 797.91
[108.52] [88.90]
(4,414.39) (2,892.58)
n=86 n=86
Net Sales 1,627.76 1,049.42
[93.62] [93.21]
(5,537.39) (4,137.71)
n=86 n=86
Match Based On:
4 Digit SIC Codes 23
3 Digit SIC Codes 44
2 Digit SIC Codes 19
Total 86
Note:  Paired t-tests for means and Wilcoxon matched-pair sign-rank tests for medians were 
performed to determine whether fraud and no-fraud firms differ significantly based on Total Assets 
and Net Sales.  No statistically significant differences exist at the 10 percent level.
19
Table 3 presents the various industries represented among the fraud firms.  
Approximately 19 percent of the firms are services-prepackaged software companies; 12
percent are computers, communication equipment and peripheral equipment companies; 
8 percent are controlling, surgical, and photographic devices companies; and 7 percent
are electrical equipment companies.  The remaining firms represent such industries as 
wholesale goods, retail goods, health services, computer services, and apparel and other 
finished products of fabrics.  Approximately 40 percent of the fraud firms in the sample 
represent “high-tech” firms.  This may provide support for the idea that firms in certain 
industries have a greater likelihood of fraud.
20
TABLE 3
INDUSTRIES REPRESENTED AMONG THE FRAUD FIRMS
SIC 
Code Industry Title
Number 
of Fraud 
Firms
Percent 
of 
Sample
1311 Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas 1 1.16%
1531 Operative Builders 1 1.16%
1600 Heavy Construction Other Than Building Construction –
Contractors 1 1.16%
2000 Food and Kindred Products 1 1.16%
2250 Knitting Mills 1 1.16%
2300 Apparel & Other Finished Products of Fabrics 4 4.65%
2721 Periodicals: Publishing or Publishing & Printing 1 1.16%
2800 Chemicals & Allied Products 3 3.49%
3140 Footwear 1 1.16%
3400 Metal Products 3 3.49%
3500 Computers, Communication Equipment & Peripheral 
Equipment 10 11.63%
3600 Electrical Equipment 6 6.98%
3700 Truck & Bus Bodies, Transportation Equipment 2 2.33%
3800 Controlling, Surgical, & Photographic Devices 7 8.14%
5045 Wholesale-Computers & Peripheral Equipment & Software 2 2.33%
5060 Wholesale-Electrical Apparatus & Equipment, Wiring Supplies 
& Electronic Parts 2 2.33%
5122 Wholesale-Drugs, Proprietaries & Druggists' Sundries 1 1.16%
5172 Wholesale-Petroleum & Petroleum Products 1 1.16%
5331 Retail-Variety Stores 1 1.16%
5661 Retail-Shoe Stores 1 1.16%
5812 Retail-Eating Places 1 1.16%
5912 Retail-Drug Stores and Proprietary Stores & Miscellaneous 
Shopping Goods Stores 2 2.33%
5961 Retail-Catalog & Mail-Order Houses 3 3.49%
7359 Services-Equipment Rental & Leasing 1 1.16%
7370 Services-Computer Programming, Data Processing, etc. 4 4.65%
7372 Services-Prepackaged Software 16 18.60%
7373 Services-Computer Integrated Systems Design 2 2.33%
7389 Services-Business Services 1 1.16%
7990 Services-Miscellaneous Amusement and Recreation 2 2.33%
8000 Services-Health Services 4 4.65%
TOTAL 86 100.00%
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Table 4 displays the occurrence of fraud in the fraud sample by year.  
Approximately 16 percent of the frauds occurred in both 1997 and 1998, 15 percent in 
1999, 10 percent in 1994, 9 percent in both 1992 and 1996, and 8 percent in 2000.  The 
remaining years each represent less than 6 percent of the fraud sample.  The last five 
years of the sample (1997-2001) represent 60 percent of the fraud sample. 
TABLE 4
OCCURRENCE OF FRAUD BY YEAR
Year Number of Fraud Firms
Percent of 
Sample
1992 8 9.30%
1993 5 5.81%
1994 9 10.47%
1995 4 4.65%
1996 8 9.30%
1997 14 16.28%
1998 14 16.28%
1999 13 15.12%
2000 7 8.14%
2001 4 4.65%
TOTAL 86 100.00%
Research Design
The SAS No. 99 fraud risk factor categories are 1) Pressure, 2) Opportunity, and 
3) Rationalization.  Proxies for each of these categories are identified and discussed 
below.  This study used a logit regression model to evaluate EP1, where
FRAUD = f(Pressure, Opportunity, Rationalization) [1]
Prior to discussing the design of the logit model, the proxies for pressure, 
opportunity, and rationalization must be introduced.  The remainder of the research 
design section is organized as follows.  The fraud risk factors proxies are categorized into 
pressure, opportunity, and rationalization.  Following the categorization of the fraud risk 
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factors, the logit regression analysis is introduced to examine EP1.  The last research 
design section introduces the discriminant analysis model used to test EP2.
Fraud Risk Factor Proxies
Pressures
Cressey argued that non-shareable pressure was perhaps the most important 
element of the fraud triangle.  In his interviews the embezzlers cited personal needs that 
engaging in fraud could potentially meet (Cressey 1953).  SAS No. 99 cites the following 
four pressures that may lead an individual to engage in fraud: 
1. Financial stability or profitability of the firm is threatened by economic, industry, 
or entity operating conditions. 
2. External pressure exists for management to meet the requirements or expectations 
of third parties. 
3. Management or directors’ personal financial situation is threatened. 
4. There is excessive pressure on management or operating personnel to meet 
financial targets set up by directors or management.
Proxy variables representing each of the four SAS No. 99 fraud risk factor 
categories of pressure were developed and tested.  Figure 3 summarizes the fraud risk 
factor proxies for pressure.
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FIGURE 3
FRAUD RISK FACTOR PROXIES FOR PRESSURE
Fraud Risk 
Factors
SAS No. 99 
Categories Proxies Definition of proxies
COMPMARG (-HHI/GP%) when GP% is greater than zero and                  (-GP%/HHI) when GP% is less than or equal to zero.
Operating income – Cash flow from operationsNICFOTA
Total assets
SGROW Change in Sales – Industry Average Change in Sales
SGROWA |Change in Sales – Industry Average Change in Sales|
AGROW The average percentage change in total assets for the two years ending before the year of fraud.
AGROWA The absolute value of the average percentage change in total assets for the two years to the fraud year.
FATA Fixed Assets / Total Assets
SALAR Sales / Accounts Receivable
SALTA Sales / Total Assets
INVSAL Inventory / Sales
Financial 
Stability
INVCA Inventory / Current Assets
Cash from operationst – Average capital expenditurest-3 to t
-1FINANCE
Current Assetst-1 
FREEC Net cash flow from operating activities - cash dividends -
capital expenditures
LEVERAGE Total Debt / Total Assets
External 
Pressure
LEV
((Long Term Debtt + Current Liabilitiest) / 
(Total Assetst)} / {(Long Term Debtt-1 + Current 
Liabilities
 t-1) / (Total assets t-1)}
OWNERSHIP The cumulative percentage of ownership in the firm held by insiders. Personal 
Financial 
Need 5%OWN The percentage of shares held by management who hold greater than 5% of the outstanding shares.
Pressures
Financial 
Targets ROA Return on assets
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Pressure:  Financial Stability Variables
SAS No. 99 suggests that when financial stability or profitability is threatened by 
economic, industry, or entity operating conditions, a firm faces pressure to commit 
financial statement fraud.  The proxies for financial stability include COMPMARG, 
NICFOTA, SGROW, SGROWA, AGROW, AGROWA, FATA, SALAR, SALTA, INVSAL, 
and INVCA.  These proxies are discussed below.
COMPMARG – measures the financial stability pressure a firm faces when a high 
degree of competition or market saturation is accompanied by a declining gross profit 
percentage.  COMPMARG is composed of two elements: degree of market competition 
and gross profit percentage.  When a firm is operating in a market with a high degree of 
competition (larger number of firms) and a declining gross profit percentage, it is 
predicted that such a firm would have greater pressure than a firm with a low degree of 
competition and a declining gross profit percentage.  Furthermore, a firm with a high 
degree of competition and an increasing gross profit percentage would have more 
pressure than a firm with a low degree of competition and an increasing gross profit 
percentage.  Figure 4 illustrates the predicted pressure.
FIGURE 4
PREDICTED PRESSURE RESULTING FROM COMBINATIONS OF DEGREE OF 
COMPETITION AND GROSS PROFIT PERCENTAGE
Degree of Competition Low High Low High
Gross Profit % Increasing Increasing Declining Declining
Predicted Pressure Least Greatest
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Degree of competition is the first element computed in the measure of 
COMPMARG.  This element is computed using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). 
HHI is a commonly accepted measure of market concentration.  Since 1982 the U.S. 
Department of Justice has used this index to assess market concentration or competition 
within a market.  It is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in 
the market and then summing the resulting numbers.  For example, for a market 
consisting of four firms with shares of 30, 30, 20, and 20 percent, the HHI is 2600 (302 + 
302  + 202 + 202 = 2600) (USDOJ 2000).
In this study, HHI was calculated for each firm individually.  This was done by 
identifying all firms found in COMPUSTAT with the same four-digit SIC code.  Then 
the market share was calculated as the percentage of sales held by each firm in that four-
digit SIC code category.  One inherent limitation of the above HHI calculation involved 
the exclusion of non-COMPUSTAT (private companies) from the market share 
calculation.
The second element, gross profit percentage (GP%), measures the change in gross 
profit percentage.  Albrecht (2002) has argued that when a revenue-related financial 
statement fraud is being perpetrated, a company’s gross profit percentage may decrease 
dramatically.  He argued that this dramatic decrease may be a result of financial 
statement fraud.  GP% is computed as the ratio of gross profit to sales in year t less the 
ratio of gross profit to sales in year t – 1, where t is the year prior to the fraud occurrence. 
COMPMARG is computed as follows: 1) when GP% is increasing (greater than 
zero) COMPMARG is computed as -1 multiplied by HHI divided by GP% (-HHI/GP%) 
and 2) when GP% is decreasing (less than or equal to zero) COMPMARG is computed as 
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-1 multiplied by GP% divided by HHI (-GP%/HHI).  When GP% is less than zero, 
COMPMARG yields the concentration per unit of gross profit decline.  The larger the 
COMPMARG number the greater the pressure would be expected.  For example, as 
competition increases (HHI gets smaller) and the gross profit decline increases, there is 
increasing pressure on a firm.  Thus, a firm with an HHI value of 500 and a 5 percent
decrease in GP% should have greater pressure than a firm with an HHI value of 10,000 
and a 5 percent decrease in GP% (i.e., -(-5/10,000) = 0.0005, which is smaller than -(-
5/100) = 0.05). In this case the firm with the lower HHI value has a larger pressure score.
When GP% is greater than zero, this measure yields the gross profit decline per 
unit of concentration.  Once again, the larger the COMPMARG number the greater the 
pressure would be expected.  For example, as competition decreases (HHI increases) and 
the gross profit margin increases, there is decreasing pressure on a firm.  Thus, a firm 
with an HHI value of 10,000 and a 5 percent increase in GP% should have less pressure 
than a firm with an HHI value of 100 and a 5 percent decrease in GP% (i.e., -10,000/5 = -
2,000, which is smaller than -100/5 = -20).  In this case the firm with the lower HHI 
value has a larger pressure score.  Figure 5 illustrates how the pressure score 
COMPMARG is computed.  COMPMARG was measured as follows.
COMPMARG =  (-HHI/GP%) when GP% is greater than zero and
 (-GP%/HHI) when GP% is less than or equal to zero.
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FIGURE 5
MEASUREMENT OF PRESSURE SCORE
Competition Low Low High High Low Low High High
HHI 10000 10000 100 100 10000 10000 100 100
GP% 5 20 5 20 -5 -20 -5 -20
COMPMARG -2000 -500 -20 -5 0.0005 0.002 0.05 0.2
Pressure Least Greatest
NICFOTA – SAS No. 99 suggests an indicator of financial stability may be 
represented by recurring negative cash flows from operations or an inability to generate 
cash flows from operations while reporting earnings and earnings growth.  NICFOTA is 
measured as follows:
NICFOTA = Operating income – Cash flow from operations
      Total assets
Where the numerator is the difference between reported net income and cash flow 
from operations.  The denominator is total assets and is used to standardize the 
numerator.  Over time, this ratio should hover around zero, with some positive years and 
some negative years.  Progressive deterioration in this ratio (measured by increasingly 
longer positive numbers) can often spell trouble and hint that financial statement fraud is 
occurring (since reported net income is increasing while cash flows are decreasing) 
(Albrecht 2002).
SGROW, SGROWA, AGROW, and AGROWA – Rapid growth or unusual 
profitability, especially compared to that of other companies in the same industry, might 
indicate financial instability.  Since one of the most significant “red flag” fraud indicators 
is the presence of rapid company growth, growth proxies for differences in firm growth 
between fraud and no-fraud firms.  Loebbecke et al. (1989) and Bell et al. (1991) stated 
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that if the company has been experiencing rapid growth, management may be motivated 
to misstate the financial statements during a downturn to give the appearance of stable 
growth.  Also, if a firm experiences growth that is less than the industry average, 
management may have pressure to engage in financial statement fraud.  Either scenario 
for growth, whether above or below industry averages, may be an indicator of fraud.  
Two methods used for calculating growth are put forth in the literature, sales 
growth (Beasley [1996] and Summers and Sweeney [1998]) and asset growth (Beneish 
[1997] and Beasley et al. [2000]).  For each of these types of growth, the growth variable 
and absolute value of growth may provide insight into a firm’s stability.  The SGROW 
proxy is computed as the change in sales less the industry average change in sales.  The 
SGROWA proxy is computed as the absolute value of the change in sales less the industry 
average change in sales.  The AGROW proxy is computed as the change in assets less the 
industry average change in assets.  The AGROWA proxy is computed as the absolute 
value of the change in assets less the industry average change in assets. 
SGROW = Change in Sales – Industry Average Change in Sales
SGROWA = |Change in Sales – Industry Average Change in Sales|
AGROW = Change in Assets – Industry Average Change in Assets
AGROWA = |Change in Assets – Industry Average Change in Assets|
FATA, SALAR, SALTA, INVSAL, and INVCA – Albrecht (2002) and Wells (1997) 
have argued for the inclusion of financial ratios in the detection of fraud.  They argued 
that certain ratios computed from the income statement and balance sheet differ among 
fraud and no-fraud firms.  Kaminski et al. (2004) and Persons (1995) found that the 
following variables were useful in detecting fraud:
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FATA – Fixed assets divided by total assets
SALAR – Sales divided by accounts receivables
SALTA – Sales divided by total assets
INVSAL – Inventory divided by sales
INVCA – Inventory divided by current assets
Interestingly, both studies argued that the use of financial ratios should be based 
on theory and coupled with demonstrated empirical evidence for their usefulness.  They 
also noted that an acceptable theoretical foundation for the selection of ratios for decision 
making does not exist.  This study argues that ratios are an important measure of the 
pressure management feels related to the firm’s financial stability.  Therefore, the 
financial ratio proxies FATA, SALAR, SALTA, INVSAL, and INVCA were included in the 
study.
Pressure:  External Pressure
Proxies for external pressure include FINANCE, FREEC, LEVERAGE, and LEV.
External pressure exists for management to meet the requirements or expectations of third 
parties due to the following: 
FINANCE and FREEC – Need to obtain additional debt or equity financing to 
stay competitive, including financing of major research and development or capital 
expenditures.  This external pressure is measured as follows. 
Dechow et al. (1996) argued that the demand for external financing depends not 
only on how much cash is generated from operating and investment activities but also on 
the funds already available within the firm.  They assumed that current assets are readily 
convertible into cash and represent the funds available to the firm.  They also suggested 
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that the average capital expenditures during the three years prior to financial statement 
manipulation are a measure of the desired investment level during the financial statement 
manipulation period.  Dechow et al. (1996) used both of these variables to measure the 
firms’ ex ante demand for financing in the first year of manipulation, t, where:
FINANCEt = Cash from operationst – Average capital expenditurest-3 to t-1
       Current Assetst-1 
When FINANCE is negative, the absolute value of the ratio (1/FINANCE) 
provides an indication of the number of years that the firm can continue to internally fund 
its current level of activity.  Dechow et al. (1996) noted that when the FINANCE variable 
is equal to –0.5, absent external financing, a firm will consume all of its available assets 
within two years.  As FINANCE becomes more negative, the pressure to engage in 
financial statement manipulation is more likely.  They also noted that if a firm has 
enough internal funds to last several years, then managers are unlikely to engage in 
manipulation immediately. 
An alternative approach to calculating FINANCE  discussed by Dechow et al.
(1996) is to calculate FREEC as net cash flow from operating activities less cash 
dividends less capital expenditures.  While this approach was not used by Dechow et al.
(1996), it may provide useful insight into the detection of fraud.  Therefore, the study 
included FREEC in addition to FINANCE.
FREEC = Net cash flow from operating activities - cash dividends 
- capital expenditures
LEVERAGE and LEV – Marginal ability to meet exchange listing requirements or 
debt repayment or other debt covenant requirements.  LEVERAGE may be positively or 
negatively associated with discretionary accruals (Vermeer 2003).  Press and Weintrop 
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(1990) found that closeness to the violation of debt covenants is associated with 
discretionary accrual choices.  DeAngelo et al. (1994) noted that troubled companies 
have large negative accruals because contractual renegotiations provide incentives to 
reduce earnings.  DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) found that high-leveraged firms have 
incentives to make income increasing discretionary accruals.  To control for the 
possibility of positive or negative effects of high leverage, this study includes two 
different measures of leverage found in the literature.  The first measure, LEVERAGE,
follows DeAngelo et al. (1994) and DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), and the second 
measure, LEV, follows Beneish (1997).  The leverage measures are calculated as follows: 
LEVERAGE = Total Debt / Total Assets
LEV = ((Long Term Debtt + Current Liabilitiest) / (Total Assetst)} 
/ {(Long Term Debtt-1 + Current Liabilitiest-1) / (Total Assetst-1)}
Pressure:  Personal Financial Need
Individuals may face significant pressure to engage in financial statement fraud 
when they face a personal financial need.  OWNERSHIP and 5%OWN are used to proxy 
for the personal financial need pressure.
OWNERSHIP and 5%OWN – Findings from Beasley (1996), COSO (1999), and 
Dunn (2004) indicate that managements' personal financial situation is threatened by the 
entity's financial performance arising from executives having significant financial 
interests in the entity.  OWNERSHIP and 5%OWN were measured as follows:
OWNERSHIP = the cumulative percentage of ownership in the firm held 
by insiders. Shares owned by management divided by the common 
shares outstanding. This yields the percent of common shares 
outstanding that are owned by management.
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5%OWN = the cumulative percentage of ownership in the firm held by 
management who hold 5 percent of the outstanding shares or more 
divided by the common shares outstanding. This yields the percent 
of common shares outstanding owned by 5 percent management 
owners.
Pressure:  Financial Targets
The last pressure category presented in SAS No. 99 relates to financial targets.  
Loebbecke et al. (1989) found that profit relative to industry was inadequate for 35 
percent of the companies with fraud in their sample.  Summers and Sweeney (1998) used 
return on assets (ROA) as a measure of financial performance to control for performance 
differences between fraud and no-fraud firms in their sample.  They found that ROA is 
significantly different among fraud and no-fraud firms.  Therefore, this study used ROA
to differentiate performance among fraud and no-fraud firms.  ROA was calculated as 
follows:
ROA = Net Income before extraordinary items
 t1 divided by Total Assets t
Opportunity
Cressey has argued that without the opportunity to engage in fraud, one cannot 
commit fraud.  According to the fraud triangle, pressure alone is not sufficient.  
According to Cressey’s theory, all three elements must be present for fraud to occur.  
Pressure creates the motive for the crime to be committed, but the employee must also 
perceive that the opportunity to commit the crime without being caught exists (Cressey 
1953).  SAS No. 99 cites the following four opportunities that may allow an individual to 
engage in fraud:
1. The nature of the industry or the entity’s operations provides opportunities to 
engage in fraudulent financial reporting.
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2. There is ineffective monitoring of management.
3. There is a complex or unstable organizational structure.
4. Internal control components are deficient.
Proxy variables representing each of the four SAS No. 99 fraud risk factor 
categories of opportunity were developed and tested below.  Figure 6 summarizes the 
fraud risk factor proxies for opportunity.
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FIGURE 6
FRAUD RISK FACTOR PROXIES FOR OPPORTUNITY
Fraud Risk 
Factors
SAS No. 99 
Categories Proxies Definition of proxies
RECEIVABLE (Receivablest/Salest –  Receivablest-1/Salest-1)
INVENTORY (Inventoryt/Salest –  Inventoryt-1/Salest-1)
Nature of 
Industry
FOROPS Foreign Sales / Total Sales
BOUT The number of board members who are outside 
members.
BOUTP The percentage of board members who are outside 
members.
BIN The number of board members who are inside members.
BINP The percentage of board members who are inside 
members.
BSIZE The number of directors on the board.
AUDCOMM
A dummy variable where 1 = mention of oversight by 
an internal audit committee and 0 = no mention of 
oversight.
AUDCSIZE The size of the audit committee.
NOEXPERT
Indicator variable with the value of 1 if audit committee 
includes no directors with financial expertise.
AUDINDEPP The percentage of audit committee members who are independent of the company.
AUDINDNUM Number of independent members on the audit 
committee.
MINMEET
Indicator variable with the value of 1 if audit committee 
meets at least four times annually during the period prior 
to the fraud; 0 otherwise.
AUDMEET The number of audit committee meetings held.
INTAUD
Indicator variable with the value of 1 if company 
indicates it has an internal audit function which reports 
to the audit; 0 otherwise.
Ineffective 
Monitoring
BLOCK Institutional shareholders who own greater than 5percent of the outstanding common stock.
TOTALTURN The number of executives leaving the company in the two years prior to fraud.
CEOTURN Indicator variable with a value of 1 if the CEO left the 
company in the two years prior to fraud; 0 otherwise.
Opportunity
Organizational 
Structure
CEOCHAIR
Indicator variable with a value of 1 if the chairperson of 
the board holds the managerial positions of CEO or 
president; 0 otherwise.
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Opportunity:  Nature of Industries
The nature of the industry or the entity’s operations may provide opportunities to 
engage in fraudulent financial reporting.  RECEIVABLE, INVENTORY, and FOROPS are 
measures of this type of opportunity. 
RECEIVABLE and INVENTORY – Certain assets, liabilities, revenues, or 
expenses are based on significant estimates that involve subjective judgments or 
uncertainties that are difficult to corroborate.  Summers and Sweeney (1998) noted that 
receivables and inventory accounts involve subjective judgment in estimating 
uncollectible accounts and obsolete inventory.  They suggested that since subjective 
judgment is involved in determining the value of these accounts, management may use 
these accounts as tools for financial statement manipulation. 
This argument is supported by Loebbecke et al. (1989), who found that the 
accounts receivable and inventory account were involved in a significant number of 
frauds in their sample.  Summers and Sweeney (1998) tested both receivables and 
inventory accounts and found that only inventory accounts differed between fraud and 
no-fraud companies.  However, this study measured both receivables and inventory.
Following Summers and Sweeney (1998), the proxy for estimates related to 
accounts receivables is the ratio of changes in receivables to sales. This measure was 
computed as the ratio of receivables to sales in year t less the ratio of receivables to sales 
in year t – 1, where t is the year prior to the fraud occurrence.  
RECEIVABLE = (Receivablet/Salest –  Receivablet-1/Salest-1)
Again, following Summers and Sweeney (1998), the proxy for inventory 
estimates is the ratio of changes in inventory to sales.  This measure was computed as the 
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ratio of inventory to sales in year t less the ratio of inventory to sales in year t – 1, where t
is the year prior to the fraud occurrence.
INVENTORY = (Inventoryt/Salest –  Inventoryt-1/Salest-1)
FOROPS – SAS No. 99 suggests that when significant operations are located or 
conducted across international borders in jurisdictions where differing business 
environments and cultures exist, the opportunity to commit fraud may be more prevalent.  
Albrecht (2002) further argued that rules and regulations for how companies conduct 
business differ from one country to the next (i.e., government regulation, financial 
reporting requirements, laws, etc.), thus allowing for greater opportunity to engage in 
financial statement fraud.  FOROPS proxies for pressure resulting from foreign 
operations:
FOROPS = Percent of sales which are foreign. This is calculated as total 
foreign sales divided by total sales.
Opportunity:  Ineffective Monitoring
Ineffective monitoring of management may result from ineffective board of 
directors or audit committee oversight over the financial reporting process and internal 
control.  This study uses BOUT, BOUTP, BIN, BINP, BSIZE, AUDCOMM, AUDSIZE, 
NOEXPERT, MINMEET, AUDMEETS, INTAUD, AUDINDNUM, AUDINDEPP, and 
BLOCK as proxies for ineffective monitoring.
BOUT, BOUTP, BIN, BINP and BSIZE – Beasley et al. (2000) found that board 
characteristics between fraud and no-fraud firms have one significant difference.  This 
difference is that the percentage of board members who are outside members is much 
lower for fraud companies than for no-fraud companies.  This finding is consistent with 
Beasley (1996) and Dechow et al. (1996).  Dunn (2004) has made the same argument, but 
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examined board inside members instead of board outside members.  His results are also 
consistent with Beasley (1996). Therefore, this study used the following proxy 
combinations of board composition:
BOUT = The number of board members who are outside members.
BOUTP = Percentage of board members who are outside members.
BIN = The number of board members who are inside members.
BINP = Percentage of board members who are inside members.
BSIZE = The total number of board members (inside + outside members)
AUDCOMM and AUDCSIZE – Beasley et al. (2000) found that the existence of 
an internal audit committee was less common among fraud companies than no-fraud 
companies.  The existence of an internal audit committee was based on whether proxy 
disclosures regarding audit-committee activities mentioned oversight of an internal audit 
function.  This study used the following measure to proxy for ineffective monitoring.
AUDCOMM = Indicator variable with the value of 1 if mention of 
oversight by an internal audit committee; and 0 otherwise.
AUDCSIZE  = The number of board members who are on the audit 
committee
Also relating to ineffective monitoring, Beasley (1996) found that board size and 
director tenure are also significantly different in fraud and no-fraud companies.  Dechow
et al. (1996) found that CEO and board chair positions held by the same person are 
correlated with fraud.  However, Beasley et al. (2000) reported results that contradict 
Beasley (1996) and Dechow et al. (1996) regarding these two measures.  These proxies 
were included in the study, even though there is some conflicting evidence in the 
literature.
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NOEXPERT, AUDINDEPP, MINMEET, and AUDMEET – The Blue Ribbon 
Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (BRC) made 
several recommendations in 1999.  These recommendations were examined by Abbott et
al. (2002).  They found that the BRC recommendations, NOEXPERT, MINMEET, and 
AUDINDEPP, are significant in identifying fraud firms.  NOEXPERT attempts to 
operationalize the BRC recommendation that at least one member of the audit committee 
possess financial expertise, through past employment experience in accounting or 
finance, requisite professional certification in accounting, or any other comparable 
experience of background which results in the individual’s financial sophistication, 
including being or having been a CEO or other senior officer with financial oversight. 
NOEXPERT was coded as follows:
NOEXPERT =  Indicator variable with the value of 1 if the audit 
committee does not include at least one director who is (or has 
been) a CPA, investment banker or venture capitalist, served as 
CFO or controller, or has held a senior management position 
(CEO, President, COO, VP, etc.) with financial responsibilities; 
and 0 otherwise.
AUDINDEPP is found to be significant in identifying fraud firms by Abbott and 
Parker (2000), Abbott et al. (2002), Beasley et al. (2000), and Robinson (2002).  
AUDINDEPP represents the percentage of the audit committee members who are 
independent of the firm.  An independent director is defined in this study as one who is 
not: a current employee of the firm, former officer or employee of the firm or related 
entity, a relative of management, professional advisor to the firm, officers of significant 
suppliers or customers of the firm, interlocking directors, and/or one who has no 
significant transactions.  This definition of independence follows Robinson (2002) and is 
a stricter definition of independence than the other cited studies.  In addition to the 
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percentage of independent audit committee members, the actual number of committee 
members may provide some insight into the importance of the audit committee’s size. 
AUDINDEPP and AUDINDNUM were calculated as follows:
AUDINDEPP = The percentage of audit committee members who are 
independent of the company.
AUDINDNUM = Number of independent members on the audit 
committee.
MINMEET – Identified in Abbott et al. (2002) as a dichotomous variable, 
MINMEET relates to the number of meetings held by the audit committee.  The BRC 
suggests that the audit committee should meet four times per year at a minimum.  
Therefore, following Abbott et al. (2002) this study coded MINMEET as follows:
MINMEET = Indicator variable with the value of 1 if the audi t committee 
met at least four times during the first fraud year; and 0 otherwise.
AUDMEET attempts to measure whether the actual number of audit committee 
meetings is useful in identifying firms with fraudulent financial statements.  AUDMEET
was calculated as follows:
AUDMEET = The number of audit committee meetings held.
INTAUD – Measures whether the audit committee has oversight over the internal 
audit function of the firm.  Defond and Jiambalvo (1991), Beasley (1996), and Bell and 
Carcello (2000) have investigated whether the role of internal monitoring mechanisms 
mitigate risk of financial misstatement.  To test the audit committee’s oversight 
(monitoring) of the firm, the study calculated INTAUD as follows:
INTAUD = Indicator variable with the value of 1 if the company indicates 
it has an internal audit function which reports to the audit 
committee; and 0 otherwise.
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BLOCK – Loebbecke and Willingham (1988) found that week controls and 
internal decentralization are positively associated with the risk of financial misstatements.  
Abbott et al. (2002) followed this research and used BLOCK, which they intended to 
control for the impact of internal control.  BLOCK is the proportion of stock controlled by 
unaffiliated 5 percent owners (it excludes the individuals identified in the 5%OWN
variable).  Following Abbott et al. (2002) this study calculated BLOCK as follows:
BLOCK = Institutional shareholders who own greater than 5 percent of the 
outstanding common stock divided by total shares outstanding.  
This variable excludes 5 percent insider shareholders.
Opportunity:  Organizational Structure
Complex or unstable organizational structure may be evidenced by high turnover 
of senior management, counsel, or board members.  Loebbecke et al. (1989) noted that in 
75 percent of the fraud cases they examined, operating and financial decisions were 
dominated by a single person.  They argued that this factor creates an environment 
allowing management to commit financial statement fraud.  Beasley (1996) controlled for 
the CEO’s power to control the company and board of directors based on tenure, 
surmising that length of time strengthens the CEO’s position of power.  This study used 
the TOTALTURN proxy to measure the influence of the management, where executive 
turnover may indicate less ability for management to engage in financial statement fraud.  
Additionally, the study used a variable measuring whether CEO turnover alone was 
related to financial statement fraud.  TOTALTURN and CEOTURN were calculated as 
follows:
TOTALTURN = the number of executives that left the firm in the two 
years prior to fraud.
CEOTURN = Indicator variable with a value of 1 if the CEO left the 
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company in the two years prior to fraud; and 0 otherwise.
CEOCHAIR – Loebbecke et al. (1989), Flatt (1996), Beasley et al. (1999), Abbott
et al. (2002), and Dunn (2004) described the structural power of the firm in varying 
forms. The major tenant of each of these studies is that as the CEO accumulates titles, the 
CEO is in a position to dominant or control decision.  The belief is that as the CEO 
accumulates more titles, he will increase his opportunity to commit fraud.  CEOCHAIR
attempts to capture the increased opportunity to commit fraud through obtaining titles.
CEOCHAIR = Indicator variable with a value of 1 if the chairperson of the 
board holds the managerial positions of CEO or president; and 0 
otherwise.
Rationalization
The final element in the fraud triangle is rationalization.  Cressey pointed out that 
rationalization is a necessary component of the crime before it takes place.  He argued 
that it is part of the motivation (like pressure) for the crime.  Cressey found that 
individuals generally rationalized their crimes by viewing them as:  1) essentially non-
criminal, 2) justified, or 3) part of a general irresponsibility for which they were not 
completely accountable.  Notably, an individual’s rationale is very difficult to observe.  It 
is not until the individual reveals his/her rationale that it becomes clear (Cressey 1953).  
SAS No. 99 recognizes the difficulty of identifying an individual’s rationale and states the 
following: 
Risk factors reflective of attitudes/rationalizations by board members, 
management, or employees that allow them to engage in and/or justify fraudulent 
financial reporting, may not be susceptible to observation by the auditor. 
Nevertheless, the auditor who becomes aware of the existence of such information 
should consider it in identifying the risks of material misstatement arising from 
fraudulent financial reporting. (SAS No. 99 Appendix)
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While rationalization is not easily identifiable, the relationship between 
management and the current or predecessor auditor may be informative.  A strained 
auditor/management relationship may reveal disputed accounting choices that were 
rationalized by management.  AUDCHANG, AUDREPORT, and TATA are used to proxy 
for rationalization.  These proxies are summarized in Figure 7.
FIGURE 7
FRAUD RISK FACTOR PROXIES FOR RATIONALIZATION
Fraud Risk 
Factors
SAS No. 99 
Categories Proxies Definition of proxies
AUDCHANG
A dummy variable for change in auditor where 1 
= change in auditor in the 2 years prior to fraud 
occurrence and 0 = no change in auditor.
AUDREPORT
A dummy variable for an audit where 1 = an 
unqualified opinion and 0 = an unqualified 
opinion with additional language.
Rationalization Rationalization
TATA
Total accruals/total assets, where total accruals 
are calculated as the change in current assets, 
minus the change in cash, minus changes in 
current liabilities, plus the change in short-term 
debt, minus depreciation and amortization 
expense, minus deferred tax on earnings, plus 
equity in earnings. 
AUDCHANG – Studies by Stice (1991) and St. Pierre and Anderson (1984) 
indicate that while a change in auditor may occur for legitimate reasons, the risk of audit 
failure and subsequent litigation is higher during an initial engagement than in subsequent 
years.  Loebbecke et al. (1989) found that a significant number of frauds in their sample 
were perpetrated in the first two years of an auditor’s tenure.  Summers and Sweeney 
(1998) have argued that a change in auditor has no significant relationship to financial 
statement fraud.  Summers and Sweeney’s argument is not supported by SAS No. 99 or 
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Albrecht (2002), who suggested a change in auditor is associated with financial statement 
fraud.  Therefore, this study included the following proxy: 
AUDCHANG  = a dummy variable for change in auditor where 1 = 
change in auditor in the 2 years prior to fraud occurrence 
and 0 = no change in auditor.
AUDREPORT – Francis and Krishnan (1999) found that auditors are less likely to 
issue a standard unqualified opinion for firms with high discretionary accruals.  
Discretionary accruals should be negatively associated with a standard unqualified 
opinion because auditors are less likely to issue a standard unqualified opinion for firms 
with high discretionary accruals (Vermeer 2003).  To control for the possible effects 
discretionary accruals have on the type of audit report, this study proposes to include a 
dummy variable that measures whether or not a firm received a standard unqualified 
opinion.  The following measure was used to proxy for this type of rationalization:
AUDREPORT = a dummy variable for an audit where 1 = an unqualified 
opinion and 0 = an unqualified opinion with additional 
language.
TATA – Beneish (1997), Francis and Krishnan (1999), and Vermeer (2003) 
argued that accruals are representative of management’s decision making and provide 
insight into their financial reporting rationalizations.  Beneish further argued that 
incentives to violate GAAP or commit fraud may increase, if managers who have 
previously made income-increasing accruals either attempt to avoid accrual reversals or 
run out of ways to increase earnings.  To capture this potential rationalization that 
managers may face, this study uses TATA.  TATA was calculated following Beneish’s 
accrual calculation:
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TATA = Total accruals divided by total assets, where total accruals are 
calculated as the change in current assets, minus the change in 
cash, minus changes in current liabilities, plus the change in short-
term debt, minus depreciation and amortization expense, minus 
deferred tax on earnings, plus equity in earnings. 
Empirical design
Logit Regression
Since the dependent variable (FRAUD) is dichotomous, logit regression analysis 
was used to examine EP1 (Beasley 1996 and Stone and Rasp 1991).  The estimation was 
based on a matched sample where 50 percent of the firms have experienced financial 
statement fraud and 50 percent of the firms have not experienced financial statement 
fraud.  The firms were matched based on size, industry, and time period (Beasley 1996).
The following logit cross-sectional regression model was used to test EP1.  This 
equation examines the empirically predicted relationship between the SAS No. 99 fraud 
risk factors and the occurrence of financial statement fraud described in EP1.  The 
equation below expands equation 1 to include proxies for pressure, opportunity, and 
rationalization.
FRAUDi =  + 1COMPMARGi + 2NICFOTAi + 3SGROWi + 4SGROWAi
+ 5AGROWi  + 6AGROWAi + 7FATAi + 8SALARi + 9SALTAi
+ 10INVSALi + 11INVCAi + 12FINANCEi + 13FREECi
+ 14LEVERAGEi + 15LEVi + 16OWNERSHIPi + 175%OWNi
+ 18ROAi + 19RECEIVABLEi + 20INVENTORYi + 21FOROPSi
+ 22BOUTi + 23BOUTPi + 24BINi + 25BINPi + 26BSIZEi
+ 27AUDCOMMi + 28AUDCSIZEi + 29NOEXPERTi
+ 30AUDINDEPPi + 31AUDINDNUMi + 32MINMEETi
+ 33AUDMEETi + 34INTAUDi + 35BLOCKi + 36TOTALTURNi
+ 37CEOTURNi + 38CEOCHAIRi + 39AUDCHANGi
+ 40AUDREPORTi + 41TATAi + i [2]
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Predicting Fraud – Logit and Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA)
To test EP2, predicting whether a firm is a fraud/no-fraud firm, this study used 
MDA.  MDA is a multivariate technique that can be used to build rules that can classify 
firms into the appropriate population.  MDA is similar to regression analysis except that 
the dependent variable is categorical (i.e., fraud = 1, no fraud = 0).  MDA allows the 
model to predict class membership of an individual firm based on a set of predictor 
variables (Johnson 1998).  In this study the predictor variables are the significant fraud 
risk factors identified by the logit analysis testing of EP1.  The model used to test EP2 is 
as follows:
FRAUD = f(Significant Fraud Risk Factors) [3]
where
Significant Fraud Risk Factors = the fraud risk factors identified as significantly 
related to the identification of fraud in equation 2.
Numerous bankruptcy prediction studies have used discriminant analysis to 
identify firms likely to fall into bankruptcy.  Altman (1968) and Altman et al. (1977) 
used MDA to develop bankruptcy prediction formulas.  Use of MDA allowed them to 
establish an equation that maximizes discrimination between categories.  However, MDA 
is flawed in that it requires the unlikely assumption that independent variables for both 
sets of firms have identical, normal distributions (Mossman et al. 1998).  To combat this 
problem, subsequent research examining bankruptcy used logistic regression instead of 
MDA (see Ohlson 1980 and Aziz et al. 1988, 1989).  Logit regression requires less 
restrictive statistical assumptions and offers better empirical discrimination (Zavgren 
1983).
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On the other hand, several studies have shown that MDA is robust in bankruptcy 
prediction and that there is no significant difference in accuracy between MDA models 
and logit analyses (see Collins and Green 1982, Cormier et al. 1995, and Allen and 
Chung 1998).  Kuruppu et al. (2003) argued that the MDA models have greater accuracy 
in predicting when compared with a logit model developed from the same data.  
Therefore, this study used MDA to predict financial statement fraud.  The developed 
model is referred to as the “fraud prediction model.”
The discriminant function that maximally discriminates between the sample 
groups can be derived from either stepwise or simultaneous estimation (Hair et al. 1995, 
and George and Mallery 2001).  The stepwise procedure is often used in preference to 
simultaneous estimation because, in practice, the stepwise discriminant procedure 
performs better than when all the variables are simultaneously entered in to the 
discriminant function (George and Mallory 2001, and Kuruppu et al. 2003).
Validation of Fraud Prediction Model
Validation of the developed model can be performed by one of two methods 
(Kuruppu et al. 2003).  The first method applies the developed model to a new sample 
(hold out sample) of companies not used to derive the model.  The second approach is 
called the Lachenbruch procedure (Jones 1987, Hair et  al. 1995, and Kuruppu et al. 
2003).  The Lachenbruch procedure (also known as jackknife or cross-validation) 
develops a model from n – 1 observations, and applies it to the observation not used in 
developing the model.  This is repeated until all the firms in the sample are used to assess 
the model’s accuracy.  Most importantly, the Lachenbruch method provides an unbiased 
estimate of the misclassification rate (Hair et al. 1995).  Since the entire sample can be 
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used to cross-validate the results, this method is considered particularly useful for studies 
with small sample sizes (Kuruppu et al. 2003).  Due to the small sample size, this study 
used the Lachenbruch method to validate the fraud prediction model.
Kuruppu et al. (2003) also noted that an important step following the validation of 
the model is determining the accuracy of the model.  The model validation by the 
Lachenbruch method provides an almost unbiased estimation of the misclassification 
rate.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY TESTS
The purpose of this study was to empirically examine the fraud risk factors 
adopted in SAS No. 99 and to develop a fraud prediction model.  The examination begins 
with an empirical analysis of the relationships between fraud risk factors.  Followed by 
empirical examination the fraud triangle risk factors adopted in SAS No. 99.  The analysis 
concludes with the development of a fraud prediction model.
Correlations and Multicollinearity
Table 5 contains the correlation coefficients for the independent variables used in 
the original logit model.  These coefficients were examined to determine whether 
multicollinearity exists in the model.  The greater the correlation between variables, the 
higher the variance will be, due to multicollinearity.  If variables are perfectly correlated, 
the result is an infinite variance and it is not possible to separate the individual effects of 
the components (Greene 2000).  Further, Kennedy (1998) has suggested that correlation 
coefficients greater than 0.80 may indicate considerable collinearity. 
The highest correlation coefficients obtained relate to the growth variables.  
AGROW and AGROWA are correlated at 0.99 and SGROW and SGROWA are correlated 
at 0.92.  These high correlations are to be expected since AGROWA is th e absolute value 
of AGROW and SGROWA is the absolute value of SGROW.   The coefficient for BOUT 
and BSIZE is 0.84.  This indicates that the number of outside directors increases as the
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board size increases.  The coefficient for AUDINDNUM and AUDCSIZE is 0.8.  This 
large coefficient is not surprising since AUDINDNUM is a subset of AUDCSIZE.  
AUDMEETS and MINMEETS have a correlation coefficient of 0.79.  This 
correlation may be explained in that MINMEETS is a dummy variable for number of 
audit committee meets equal to or greater than 4, while AUDMEETS is the number of 
audit committee meetings.  AUDINDNUM and AUDINDEPP have a correlation 
coefficient of 0.77, since AUDINDNUM represents the number of independent audit 
committee members and AUDINDEPP represents the percentage of audit committee 
members who are independent, this high correlation is to be expected.  There are no other 
correlation coefficients greater than 0.75, with the vast majority of the remaining 
coefficients having values less than 0.5. 
When correlations are high, one of the variables is removed from the logit 
regressions.  This is done to prevent multicollinearity.  In addition to reviewing the 
correlation coefficients, the study also regressed each independent variable on the 
remaining variables.  This was done to test for significance among independent variables.  
The results from the regressions were similar to those identified in the correlation test and 
did not reveal any significant relationships other than those identified in the correlation 
analysis.  Therefore, the independent variable regressions are not presented here.
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TABLE 5
CORRELATION MATRIX
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 FRAUD 1.000 -0.091 0.022 0.066 0.050 0.070 0.080 -0.021 0.050 -0.095 0.113
2 COMPMARG 1.000 -0.040 0.009 0.028 -0.037 -0.036 0.047 0.017 0.026 0.022
3 NICFOTA 1.000 0.009 0.031 0.011 0.023 -0.067 0.022 -0.097 -0.054
4 SGROW 1.000 0.920 -0.019 -0.021 0.050 0.030 0.065 0.006
5 SGROWA 1.000 -0.015 -0.017 -0.023 0.007 0.041 -0.013
6 AGROW 1.000 0.993 0.189 -0.005 -0.012 -0.044
7 AGROWA 1.000 0.193 -0.007 -0.018 -0.047
8 FATA 1.000 0.132 -0.042 0.035
9 SALAR 1.000 0.000 -0.028
10 SALTA 1.000 -0.180
11 INVSAL 1.000
12 INVCA
13 FINANCE
14 FREEC
15 LEVERAGE
16 LEV
17 OWNERSHIP
18 5%Own
19 ROA
20 RECEIVABLE
21 INVENTORY
22 FOROPS
23 BOUT
24 BOUTP
25 BIN
26 BINP
27 BSIZE
28 AUDCOMM
29 AUDCSIZE
30 NOEXPERT
31 AUDINDEPP
32 AUDINDNUM
33 MINMEET
34 AUDMEET
35 INTAUD
36 BLOCK
37 TOTALTURN
38 CEOTURN
39 CEOCHAIR
40 AUDCHANG
41 AUDREPORT
42 TATA
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TABLE 5 (CONTINUED)
CORRELATION MATRIX
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
1 FRAUD -0.035 -0.064 -0.087 0.017 -0.004 -0.072 0.227 -0.067 -0.086 0.091 0.089
2 COMPMARG -0.030 -0.034 0.394 -0.089 -0.009 0.077 0.089 -0.044 0.016 0.011 -0.130
3 NICFOTA 0.046 0.221 -0.052 0.023 -0.098 0.000 -0.032 0.644 0.044 -0.025 0.154
4 SGROW -0.028 -0.049 -0.070 -0.027 -0.033 0.164 0.142 -0.031 0.008 -0.057 -0.013
5 SGROWA -0.130 -0.033 0.043 -0.105 -0.029 0.172 0.145 -0.014 0.075 -0.047 0.007
6 AGROW -0.014 0.079 0.262 0.017 -0.019 -0.130 0.003 0.047 -0.015 -0.006 -0.002
7 AGROWA -0.020 0.082 0.261 0.014 -0.016 -0.138 0.004 0.056 -0.016 -0.007 -0.003
8 FATA 0.121 -0.132 0.061 0.254 -0.048 -0.033 0.037 0.032 -0.095 0.054 0.032
9 SALAR 0.017 0.019 -0.014 0.094 -0.038 -0.034 0.038 0.030 -0.022 -0.117 -0.008
10 SALTA 0.194 0.123 0.002 -0.022 -0.011 0.256 0.099 0.071 -0.107 -0.131 -0.019
11 INVSAL 0.244 -0.732 -0.035 0.061 -0.055 -0.049 -0.040 -0.494 0.028 0.667 -0.004
12 INVCA 1.000 -0.098 -0.142 0.140 -0.006 0.017 -0.172 -0.039 -0.110 0.018 0.005
13 FINANCE 1.000 0.196 -0.044 0.019 0.079 0.070 0.725 0.008 -0.552 0.045
14 FREEC 1.000 -0.096 -0.015 0.028 0.034 0.057 -0.010 -0.012 0.069
15 LEVERAGE 1.000 -0.063 0.119 0.035 -0.056 0.001 -0.051 0.106
16 LEV 1.000 -0.113 -0.113 -0.045 -0.033 -0.026 -0.191
17 OWNERSHIP 1.000 0.556 0.044 -0.074 -0.068 -0.092
18 5%Own 1.000 0.048 0.015 -0.066 -0.049
19 ROA 1.000 -0.040 -0.258 0.108
20 RECEIVABLE 1.000 0.065 0.006
21 INVENTORY 1.000 0.000
22 FOROPS 1.000
23 BOUT
24 BOUTP
25 BIN
26 BINP
27 BSIZE
28 AUDCOMM
29 AUDCSIZE
30 NOEXPERT
31 AUDINDEPP
32 AUDINDNUM
33 MINMEET
34 AUDMEET
35 INTAUD
36 BLOCK
37 TOTALTURN
38 CEOTURN
39 CEOCHAIR
40 AUDCHANG
41 AUDREPORT
42 TATA
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TABLE 5 (CONTINUED)
CORRELATION MATRIX
23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
1 FRAUD -0.090 -0.115 -0.013 0.115 -0.094 -0.214 -0.086 -0.094 -0.286 -0.210 0.016
2 COMPMARG -0.204 -0.056 -0.050 0.056 -0.223 0.009 -0.264 -0.080 0.004 -0.243 0.047
3 NICFOTA 0.062 0.025 0.087 -0.025 0.107 0.169 0.083 0.117 0.050 0.024 0.111
4 SGROW -0.121 -0.139 -0.026 0.139 -0.130 -0.284 -0.158 -0.088 -0.197 -0.136 -0.092
5 SGROWA -0.159 -0.141 -0.015 0.141 -0.160 -0.260 -0.194 -0.067 -0.168 -0.151 -0.004
6 AGROW 0.207 0.083 0.014 -0.083 0.207 0.049 0.225 0.131 0.073 0.230 0.228
7 AGROWA 0.224 0.083 0.025 -0.083 0.228 0.053 0.226 0.142 0.081 0.235 0.257
8 FATA 0.219 0.091 0.048 -0.091 0.236 0.112 0.224 0.071 0.084 0.183 0.193
9 SALAR 0.036 0.094 -0.081 -0.094 -0.010 0.033 0.022 -0.044 -0.021 -0.018 -0.043
10 SALTA -0.001 -0.023 0.006 0.023 0.002 -0.080 0.027 0.100 0.018 0.077 -0.030
11 INVSAL -0.106 -0.098 0.039 0.098 -0.080 -0.018 -0.081 -0.070 0.006 -0.064 -0.085
12 INVCA 0.204 0.156 -0.055 -0.156 0.166 0.003 0.102 0.096 -0.062 0.025 -0.040
13 FINANCE 0.227 0.251 -0.133 -0.251 0.144 0.167 0.180 0.119 0.138 0.172 0.032
14 FREEC -0.037 0.045 -0.098 -0.045 -0.089 0.014 -0.137 0.042 0.030 -0.114 0.195
15 LEVERAGE 0.130 0.066 0.029 -0.066 0.141 0.011 0.095 0.033 0.096 0.134 -0.021
16 LEV -0.020 0.015 -0.063 -0.015 -0.054 -0.031 -0.013 -0.096 -0.029 -0.017 -0.023
17 OWNERSHIP -0.143 -0.113 0.023 0.113 -0.125 -0.041 -0.136 0.017 0.075 -0.034 -0.179
18 5%Own -0.177 -0.161 0.000 0.161 -0.170 -0.009 -0.065 -0.004 0.033 -0.020 -0.078
19 ROA 0.124 0.088 0.046 -0.088 0.144 0.207 0.172 0.140 0.167 0.164 0.105
20 RECEIVABLE -0.068 -0.162 0.261 0.162 0.078 0.022 -0.002 -0.083 0.042 0.021 -0.051
21 INVENTORY -0.090 -0.204 0.173 0.204 0.008 -0.022 -0.082 -0.115 0.046 -0.025 -0.017
22 FOROPS 0.119 0.141 -0.037 -0.141 0.094 0.023 0.063 -0.011 -0.010 0.025 0.154
23 BOUT 1.000 0.701 -0.211 -0.701 0.843 0.316 0.511 0.301 0.291 0.473 0.250
24 BOUTP 1.000 -0.706 -1.000 0.284 0.338 0.386 0.212 0.326 0.363 0.146
25 BIN 1.000 0.706 0.348 0.013 -0.058 -0.017 -0.119 -0.107 -0.051
26 BINP 1.000 -0.284 -0.338 -0.386 -0.212 -0.326 -0.363 -0.146
27 BSIZE 1.000 0.310 0.458 0.280 0.213 0.395 0.211
28 AUDCOMM 1.000 0.540 0.233 0.604 0.473 0.108
29 AUDCSIZE 1.000 0.284 0.432 0.802 0.166
30 NOEXPERT 1.000 0.307 0.359 0.065
31 AUDINDEPP 1.000 0.774 0.152
32 AUDINDNUM 1.000 0.200
33 MINMEET 1.000
34 AUDMEET
35 INTAUD
36 BLOCK
37 TOTALTURN
38 CEOTURN
39 CEOCHAIR
40 AUDCHANG
41 AUDREPORT
42 TATA
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TABLE 5 (CONTINUED)
CORRELATION MATRIX
34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42
1 FRAUD -0.050 -0.013 0.038 -0.009 0.029 0.122 0.038 0.079 -0.075
2 COMPMARG -0.033 -0.121 0.026 0.044 0.071 -0.056 0.002 0.044 -0.013
3 NICFOTA 0.086 0.055 0.089 -0.121 -0.198 0.061 -0.100 -0.045 0.658
4 SGROW -0.130 -0.041 0.176 0.127 0.117 -0.124 0.239 -0.043 -0.027
5 SGROWA -0.049 -0.077 0.120 0.192 0.185 -0.139 0.231 -0.038 -0.010
6 AGROW 0.267 0.192 -0.001 -0.099 -0.054 0.124 -0.062 0.065 0.016
7 AGROWA 0.284 0.193 -0.001 -0.095 -0.039 0.114 -0.067 0.084 0.017
8 FATA 0.268 0.153 0.079 -0.132 -0.004 0.166 -0.100 0.162 0.010
9 SALAR 0.004 -0.044 -0.009 0.033 -0.048 -0.126 0.256 -0.050 0.004
10 SALTA -0.015 0.149 -0.026 -0.015 0.127 0.067 0.150 0.062 -0.218
11 INVSAL -0.102 0.043 -0.080 0.000 0.033 0.070 -0.075 0.043 0.020
12 INVCA 0.016 0.139 0.048 -0.163 -0.059 0.144 -0.055 -0.056 0.027
13 FINANCE 0.071 0.006 0.161 -0.017 -0.070 -0.052 -0.004 0.047 0.243
14 FREEC 0.111 -0.023 0.031 0.046 0.069 0.007 -0.008 0.057 0.002
15 LEVERAGE -0.022 0.089 0.167 0.108 0.105 0.100 0.057 0.044 0.046
16 LEV -0.108 -0.081 0.014 -0.030 -0.107 -0.059 -0.077 0.170 0.035
17 OWNERSHIP -0.136 -0.138 -0.005 0.080 0.047 -0.065 0.273 -0.074 -0.022
18 5%Own -0.112 -0.138 0.013 0.113 0.086 -0.114 0.132 0.061 -0.085
19 ROA 0.160 0.101 0.141 -0.135 -0.210 0.039 -0.025 -0.004 0.505
20 RECEIVABLE -0.055 -0.046 0.025 -0.068 -0.054 0.049 -0.031 -0.047 0.038
21 INVENTORY -0.015 0.113 -0.053 -0.017 -0.013 0.121 -0.159 -0.036 0.033
22 FOROPS 0.165 0.051 0.112 0.066 0.040 0.166 0.056 0.039 0.003
23 BOUT 0.344 0.351 0.171 0.029 0.062 0.039 -0.110 0.086 0.129
24 BOUTP 0.242 0.147 0.150 0.040 0.108 -0.163 -0.031 0.105 0.139
25 BIN -0.053 0.002 -0.032 -0.046 -0.112 0.215 -0.077 -0.082 0.013
26 BINP -0.242 -0.147 -0.150 -0.040 -0.108 0.163 0.031 -0.105 -0.139
27 BSIZE 0.301 0.338 0.146 0.002 -0.002 0.156 -0.148 0.038 0.131
28 AUDCOMM 0.292 0.151 0.087 -0.082 -0.109 -0.092 -0.221 0.023 0.296
29 AUDCSIZE 0.364 0.272 0.080 -0.115 -0.078 0.067 -0.170 0.057 0.187
30 NOEXPERT 0.228 0.243 -0.021 0.038 0.088 0.013 0.002 0.059 0.067
31 AUDINDEPP 0.304 0.236 -0.046 -0.032 -0.065 -0.017 -0.096 0.010 0.178
32 AUDINDNUM 0.381 0.327 -0.032 -0.074 -0.049 0.030 -0.111 0.057 0.142
33 MINMEET 0.787 0.143 -0.028 0.084 0.085 0.129 -0.141 0.055 0.033
34 AUDMEET 1.000 0.217 -0.050 0.073 0.073 0.132 -0.164 0.015 0.089
35 INTAUD 1.000 0.058 -0.076 -0.084 0.225 -0.022 -0.046 0.046
36 BLOCK 1.000 0.064 0.085 -0.026 -0.066 0.212 0.083
37 TOTALTURN 1.000 0.555 -0.095 0.010 0.061 -0.056
38 CEOTURN 1.000 -0.157 -0.074 0.181 -0.160
39 CEOCHAIR 1.000 -0.069 0.007 -0.052
40 AUDCHANG 1.000 -0.128 -0.226
41 AUDREPORT 1.000 0.039
42 TATA 1.000
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Empirical Results
The first empirical prediction (EP1) addresses the usefulness of the SAS No. 99
fraud risk factors in identifying financial statement fraud.  Usefulness in this study is 
defined as a significant difference among fraud risk factors between fraud and no-fraud 
firms or as individual fraud risk factors found to be significant in explaining fraud.  The 
study employs two methods to identify the significant fraud risk factors, univariate 
analysis and logistical regression. 
Table 6 presents univariate descriptive statistics for each independent variable for 
the sample of fraud firms and their related match firm.  The mean and standard deviation 
for each independent variable are presented along with statistical comparison between 
means and medians for each independent variable between fraud and no-fraud firms.  
Differences in means are evaluated using t-tests, while differences in medians are 
evaluated using Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (Dunn 2004).  There are significant differences 
between means at the 1 percent level for the variables AUDINDEPP, 5%OWN, 
AUDCOMM, and AUDINDNUM.  There are no other significant differences among 
means less than the 10 percent level.  Significant differences among medians are found at 
the 1 percent level (AUDINDEPP, 5%OWN, AUDCOMM, FREEC and AUDINDNUM), 
the 5 percent level (BOUT, BOUTP, BINP, BSIZE, AGROW, AGROWA, SALTA, SALAR,
and NICFOTA), and the 10 percent level (CEOCHAIR, SGROW, and FINANCE,). 
The significant differences among means(medians) identified one(nine) pressure 
and four(eight) opportunity risk factors.  It is interesting that no rationalization risk 
factors were identified as being significantly different.  This supports SAS No. 99’s
assertion that rationalization is difficult to identify and observer.  This may also be an 
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indicator that additional or better rationalization risk factors need to be identified.  This 
study does not identify any further fraud risk factors for rationalization.  These initial 
results may indicate that at least some of the pressure and opportunity fraud risk factors 
may be useful in identifying fraud firms.  However, further analysis is needed to 
determine whether the univariate results are useful.
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TABLE 6
WILCOXON SIGN-RANK TEST
Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev T  Value Pr > |t | Z Pr > |Z|
COMPMARG -433.70 930.15 -1552.00 8651.20 1.190 0.236 0.075 0.470
NICFOTA -0.04 0.15 -0.03 0.28 -0.290 0.772 -1.824 0.034 **
SGROW -39.17 362.12 81.87 1250.00 -0.860 0.391 -1.429 0.077 *
SGROWA 170.83 321.17 259.61 1225.20 -0.650 0.517 0.458 0.324
AGROW 155.30 663.76 333.56 1679.90 -0.920 0.362 -1.814 0.035 **
AGROWA 161.83 662.18 364.63 1673.30 -1.050 0.298 -1.823 0.034 **
FATA 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.270 0.788 0.250 0.402
SALAR 11.78 25.99 20.02 113.07 -0.660 0.511 2.075 0.019 **
SALTA 1.42 1.49 1.19 0.88 1.250 0.214 1.983 0.024 **
INVSAL 0.17 0.31 0.35 1.08 -1.480 0.141 -0.331 0.371
INVCA 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.460 0.649 0.558 0.288
FINANCE -0.10 0.51 -0.18 0.67 0.840 0.402 1.524 0.064 *
FREEC 15.89 170.69 -9.16 112.47 1.140 0.258 3.236 0.001 ***
LEVERAGE 0.20 0.25 0.21 0.22 -0.220 0.826 -0.785 0.216
LEV 1.40 2.62 1.38 2.21 0.050 0.961 0.026 0.490
OWNERSHIP 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.950 0.345 1.069 0.143
5%OWN 0.21 0.21 0.32 0.23 -3.040 0.003 *** -3.173 0.001 ***
ROA -4.25 34.23 -9.40 42.61 0.870 0.383 0.522 0.301
RECEIVABLE 0.14 0.99 0.02 0.11 1.130 0.261 -0.097 0.462
INVENTORY -0.04 0.62 0.10 0.81 -1.190 0.236 0.480 0.316
FOROPS -0.02 0.37 0.04 0.18 -1.170 0.245 0.664 0.254
BOUT 5.09 1.93 4.66 2.76 1.180 0.239 1.952 0.026 **
BOUTP 0.69 0.18 0.64 0.19 1.510 0.132 1.717 0.043 **
BIN 2.27 1.52 2.23 1.21 0.170 0.868 -0.527 0.299
BINP 0.31 0.18 0.36 0.19 -1.510 0.132 -1.717 0.043 **
BSIZE 7.36 1.89 6.90 2.96 1.230 0.222 2.149 0.016 **
AUDCOMM 0.99 0.11 0.88 0.32 2.850 0.005 *** 2.793 0.003 ***
AUDCSIZE 2.84 0.99 2.64 1.29 1.130 0.262 1.173 0.121
NOEXPERT 0.49 0.50 0.40 0.49 1.230 0.222 1.223 0.111
AUDINDEPP 0.88 0.25 0.68 0.39 3.880 0.000 *** 3.719 <0.001 ***
AUDINDNUM 2.57 1.06 2.04 1.42 2.800 0.006 *** 2.983 0.001 ***
MINMEET 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.36 -0.220 0.830 -0.213 0.416
AUDMEET 2.04 1.81 1.86 1.70 0.650 0.515 0.646 0.259
INTAUD 0.26 0.44 0.24 0.43 0.180 0.861 0.174 0.431
BLOCK 0.24 0.23 0.26 0.23 -0.490 0.625 -0.551 0.291
TOTALTURN 1.14 1.39 1.12 1.29 0.110 0.910 -0.061 0.476
CEOTURN 0.19 0.39 0.21 0.41 -0.380 0.704 -0.380 0.352
CEOCHAIR 0.59 0.49 0.71 0.46 -1.600 0.111 -1.593 0.056 *
AUDCHANG 0.09 0.29 0.12 0.32 -0.500 0.621 -0.494 0.311
AUDREPORT 0.19 0.39 0.26 0.49 -1.030 0.304 -0.814 0.208
TATA -3.57 22.69 -93.85 851.02 0.980 0.328 -0.801 0.212
Wilcoxon t 
Approximation
*p <0.10; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01.
NO-FRAUD 
FIRMS FRAUD FIRMS t-statistic
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Tables 7 through 10 present the logit regression results.  Table 7 presents the logit 
results for all fraud risk factors, excluding those that are correlated at greater than 80
percent.  This model has a pseudo-R2 of 34.64 percent.  The pseudo R-square is similar to 
the R-square that is found in ordinary least squares regression analysis.  The larger the 
pseudo R-square the better the independent variables explain the dependent variable.  In 
this study, the larger the pseudo R-square the better the fraud risk factors are in 
explaining fraud.  The pseudo R-square value in this model is similar or slightly larger 
than other studies in this area (Robinson 2002).  The model has a Wald chi-square value 
of 34.938 and a likelihood ratio of 73.1335, both of which are significant at the 1 percent
level.  The Wald chi-square and likelihood ratio were used to measure the fit of the 
model.  In general, the likelihood-ratio test and the Wald test give approximately the 
same value when the sample size is large.  In small to moderate samples, such as this 
study, it is recommended that the likelihood ratio test be used (Greene 2000).
Six variables were found to be significant in this model.  They were 5%OWN and 
OWNERSHIP at the 1 percent level, ROA and FREEC at the 5 percent level, and 
NICFOTA and FINANCE at the 10 percent level.  Each of the significant variables is a 
pressure variable, indicating that pressure may be the most significant fraud risk factor 
category.
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TABLE 7
LOGIT REGRESSION: ALL VARIABLES
FRAUDi =  + 1COMPMARGi + 2NICFOTAi + 3SGROWi + 4AGROWAi + 5FATAi + 6SALARi
+ 7SALTAi + 8INVSALi + 9INVCAi + 10FINANCEi + 11FREECi + 12LEVERAGEi
+ 13LEVi + 14OWNERSHIPi + 155%OWNi + 16ROAi + 17RECEIVABLEi
+ 18INVENTORYi + 19FOROPSi + 20BOUTi + 21BOUTPi + 22BINi + 23AUDCOMMi
+ 24NOEXPERTi + 25AUDINDEPPi + 26AUDINDNUMi + 27MINMEETi + 28AUDMEETi
+ 29INTAUDi + 30BLOCKi + 31TOTALTURNi + 32CEOTURNi + 33CEOCHAIRi
+ 34AUDCHANGi + 35AUDREPORTi + 36TATAi + i
Variable Estimate Standard Error Wald Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept 5.6959 2.8384 4.0269 0.0448 **
COMPMARG -0.0001 0.0002 0.6552 0.4183
NICFOTA 4.2857 2.3953 3.2012 0.0736 *
SGROW 0.0000 0.0006 0.0017 0.9673
AGROWA 0.0004 0.0004 0.8083 0.3686
FATA -0.1902 1.7403 0.0120 0.9129
SALAR 0.0037 0.0091 0.1674 0.6825
SALTA -0.1821 0.2632 0.4788 0.4890
INVSAL 0.9153 0.7947 1.3266 0.2494
INVCA -1.2972 1.1248 1.3299 0.2488
FINANCE 3.1049 1.6685 3.4628 0.0628 *
FREEC -0.0045 0.0020 5.0632 0.0244 **
LEVERAGE -0.0890 0.9816 0.0082 0.9278
LEV 0.0495 0.0830 0.3561 0.5507
OWNERSHIP -4.6756 1.6624 7.9107 0.0049 ***
5%OWN 5.9666 1.4201 17.6523 <0.0001 ***
ROA -0.0424 0.0220 3.7113 0.0540 **
RECEIVABLE -2.4294 1.6639 2.1318 0.1443
INVENTORY 0.8566 0.9768 0.7691 0.3805
FOROPS 1.2357 1.0797 1.3099 0.2524
BOUT 0.0411 0.1746 0.0554 0.8140
BOUTP -4.3854 3.7645 1.3571 0.2440
BIN -0.4480 0.3614 1.5367 0.2151
AUDCOMM -1.5377 1.4761 1.0852 0.2975
NOEXPERT 0.1180 0.4518 0.0682 0.7940
AUDINDEPP -1.1349 1.1265 1.0150 0.3137
AUDINDNUM -0.3308 0.2994 1.2213 0.2691
MINMEET -0.0614 0.9097 0.0046 0.9462
AUDMEET 0.2073 0.1981 1.0955 0.2953
INTAUD 0.5394 0.5535 0.9497 0.3298
BLOCK 0.3886 0.9954 0.1524 0.6963
TOTALTURN -0.2578 0.1815 2.0184 0.1554
CEOTURN 0.3655 0.6530 0.3134 0.5756
CEOCHAIR 0.6280 0.4601 1.8627 0.1723
AUDCHANG 0.7236 0.7970 0.8242 0.3639
AUDREPORT 0.3373 0.4786 0.4966 0.4810
TATA -0.0004 0.0018 0.0436 0.8346
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TABLE 7 (CONTINUED)
Pseudo-R2 0.3464
Liklihood ratio 73.1335 ***
Wald Chi-Square 34.9380
*p <0.10; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01.
Table 8 examines whether the fraud risk factors found to be significantly different 
among fraud and no-fraud firms under the Wilcoxon test were useful in identifying fraud.  
This model has a Pseudo R-square of 20.96 percent and a likelihood ratio of 75.5502, 
which was significant at the 1 percent level.  The logit regression identifies three fraud 
risk factors (two pressure and one opportunity variable) with significance less than 10
percent.  These include 5%OWN at the 1 percent level and FREEC and AUDINDEPP at 
the 10 percent level.  These results indicate that only a few of the variables identified as 
significantly different among fraud and no-fraud firms using the Wilcoxon test were 
useful.  See Table 8 below.
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TABLE 8
LOGIT REGRESSION: WILCOXON 10% SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES
FRAUDi = 0 + 1NICFOTA + 2AGROW + 3AGROWA + 4SALAR +5SALTA + 6FREEC
+ 75%OWN + 8BOUT + 9BOUTP + 10BSIZE + 11AUDCOMM + 12AUDINDEPP
+ 13AUDINDNUM  + 
Variable Estimate Standard Error Wald Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept 4.4709 2.4810 3.2474 0.0715 *
NICFOTA 0.7383 0.8814 0.7017 0.4022
AGROW -0.0061 0.0065 0.8724 0.3503
AGROWA 0.0066 0.0066 1.0134 0.3141
SALAR 0.0009 0.0024 0.1553 0.6935
SALTA -0.2827 0.2145 1.7376 0.1874
FREEC -0.0025 0.0014 3.0809 0.0792 *
5%OWN 0.0258 0.0085 9.2692 0.0023 ***
BOUT 0.4365 0.4827 0.8177 0.3659
BOUTP -2.6281 3.5085 0.5611 0.4538
BSIZE -0.3974 0.3295 1.4549 0.2277
AUDCOMM -1.0091 1.3178 0.5863 0.4439
AUDINDEPP -1.5871 0.9385 2.8597 0.0908 *
AUDINDNUM -0.1079 0.2460 0.1925 0.6608
Pseudo-R2 0.2096
Likelihood ratio 75.5502 ***
Wald chi-square 26.0350 **
*p <0.10; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01.
The next step in the study was to examine the fraud risk factors relationship to 
fraud using a variation of logit regression called stepwise logit regression.  Stepwise 
regression is a technique for choosing which variables to include in a regression model.  
This technique consists of two components:  forward selection and backward selection.  
The model goes through an iteration process where forward stepwise is used initially to 
select the first variable, the variable with the greatest statistical significance to be 
introduced into the model.  The first step is followed by backward stepwise to remove 
variables from the model that are statistically insignificant.  The process at each forward 
step adds the most statistically significant term (the one with the highest Wald chi-
statistic or lowest p-value).  The stepwise process alternates between forward selection 
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and backward selection until no more variables can be added or removed at a prespecified 
significance level.  This study uses a significance level of 10 percent.
An important assumption behind this method is that some input variables in a 
logit regression do not have an important explanatory effect on the response.  If this 
assumption is true, then it is a convenient simplification to keep only the statistically 
significant terms in the model.  One common problem that may exist in logit regression 
analysis is multicollinearity of the input variables.  The input variables may be as 
correlated with each other as they are with the response.  If this is the case, the presence 
of one input variable in the model may mask the effect of another input.  This may result 
in the stepwise regression including different variables than the normal logit regression, 
depending on the choice of starting model and inclusion strategy.
Table 9 presents the stepwise logit regression for all included fraud risk factors. 
This model has an R-square of 20.86 percent and likelihood ratio of 40.2321 that was 
significant at the 1 percent level.  Four variables (two pressure and two opportunity) were 
found to be significant using this approach.  5%OWN, OWNERSHIP, and AUDINDEPP
were significant at the 1 percent level and CEOCHAIR was significant at the 5 percent
level. 
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TABLE 9
STEPWISE LOGIT REGRESSION: ALL VARIABLES
FRAUDi =  + 1COMPMARGi + 2NICFOTAi + 3SGROWi + 4AGROWAi + 5FATAi + 6SALARi
+ 7SALTAi + 8INVSALi + 9INVCAi + 10FINANCEi + 11FREECi + 12LEVERAGEi
+ 13LEVi + 14OWNERSHIPi + 155%OWNi + 16ROAi + 17RECEIVABLEi
+ 18INVENTORYi + 19FOROPSi + 20BOUTi + 21BOUTPi + 22BINi + 23AUDCOMMi
+ 24NOEXPERTi + 25AUDINDEPPi + 26AUDINDNUMi + 27MINMEETi + 28AUDMEETi
+ 29INTAUDi + 30BLOCKi + 31TOTALTURNi + 32CEOTURNi + 33CEOCHAIRi
+ 34AUDCHANGi + 35AUDREPORTi + 36TATAi + i
Step Entered Removed Wald Chi-Square
1 AUDINDEPP 14.0199 ***
2 5%OWN 10.36 ***
3 OWNERSHIP 9.8319 ***
4 CEOCHAIR 4.0874 ***
5 RECEIVABLE 2.6646
6 RECEIVABLE --
Variable Estimate Standard Error Wald Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept 0.7602 0.5677 1.7932 0.1805
OWNERSHIP -0.0381 0.0125 9.2076 0.0024 ***
5%OWN 0.0465 0.011 17.7829 <0.0001 ***
AUDINDEPP -2.0962 0.5731 13.3791 0.0003 ***
CEOCHAIR 0.7403 0.3694 4.0158 0.0451 **
Pseudo-R2 0.2086
Likelihood ratio 40.2321 ***
Wald chi-square 28.4858 ***
Summary of Stepwise Selection:
Summary of Stepwise Logit Model:
*p <0.10; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01.
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Table 10 reports whether the fraud risk factors found to be significantly different 
among fraud and no-fraud firms under the Wilcoxon test were useful in predicting fraud.  
The stepwise logistic regression approach was used in this model.  This model has a 
Pseudo R-square of 13.71 percent and a likelihood ratio of 25.3695, which was 
significant at the 1 percent level.  Using this approach, two variables (1 pressure and 1 
opportunity) were found to be significant in predicting fraud, 5%OWN and 
AUDINDEPP.  Both variables were significant at the 1 percent level.
TABLE 10
STEPWISE LOGIT REGRESSION: WILCOXON 10% SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES
FRAUDi = 0 + 1NICFOTA + 2AGROW + 3AGROWA + 4SALAR +5SALTA + 6FREEC
+ 75%OWN + 8BOUT + 9BOUTP + 10BSIZE + 11AUDCOMM + 12AUDINDEPP
+ 13AUDINDNUM  + 
Step Entered Removed Wald Chi-Square
1 AUDINDEPP 14.0199 ***
2 5%OWN 10.36 ***
3 SALTA 2.2651
4 SALTA --
Variable Estimate Standard Error Wald Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept 0.9808 0.4915 3.9821 0.046 **
5%OWN 0.0239 0.0077 9.6344 0.0019 ***
AUDINDEPP -2.0311 0.5477 13.7501 0.0002 ***
Pseudo-R2 0.1371
Likelihood ratio 25.3695 ***
Wald chi-square 20.7083 ***
Summary of Stepwise Selection:
Summary of Stepwise Logit Model:
*p <0.10; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01.
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Table 11 reports the significant fraud risk factors identified through the univariate 
and logit techniques.  Of the significant fraud risk factors under the various logit 
approaches, only 5%OWN was found to be significant in each of the four models. 
AUDINDEPP was significant in the last three logit models.  FREEC was found to be 
significant in the first and second logit models, and OWNERSHIP was found to be 
significant in the first and third models.  The following four variables (CEOCHAIR, 
NICFOTA, FINANCE, and ROA) were found to be significant in only one logit model.  
No other variables were found to be significant in the logit regression analysis.  
These initial results indicate that the pressure and opportunity fraud risk factors 
are more useful or are stronger indicators of fraud than the rationalization variables.  This 
may be an actuality or may be due to inadequate identification of rationalization fraud 
risk factors.  Whichever the case, there remains a need to continue to try and identify 
fraud risk factors in all categories that may be useful in differentiating between fraud and 
no-fraud firms.  Furthermore, from the identified fraud risk factors, the pressure fraud 
risk factors were found to be significantly different among the models more often than 
the opportunity fraud risk factors.  This may indicate that pressure is the strongest 
indicator of fraud.  The Table 11 results are found below.
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 TABLE 11
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES
Significant 
Variable Wilcoxon Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
# of Models 
Significant
NICFOTA Yes Yes No No No 2
SGROW Yes No No No No 1
AGROW Yes No No No No 1
AGROWA Yes No No No No 1
SALAR Yes No No No No 1
SALTA Yes No No No No 1
FINANCE Yes Yes No No No 2
FREEC Yes Yes Yes No No 3
OWNERSHIP No Yes No Yes No 2
5%Own Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 5
ROA No Yes No No No 1
BOUT Yes No No No No 1
BOUTP Yes No No No No 1
BINP Yes No No No No 1
BSIZE Yes No No No No 1
AUDCOMM Yes No No No No 1
AUDINDEPP Yes No Yes Yes Yes 4
AUDINDNUM Yes No No No No 1
CEOCHAIR Yes No No Yes No 2
Model 1 = Logit with all variables (TABLE 7)
Model 2 = Logit with only significant Wilcoxon variables (TABLE 8)
Model 3 = Stepwise logit all variables (TABLE 9)
Model 4 = Stepwise logit only significant Wilcoxon variables (TABLE 10)
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Discriminant Analysis
The second empirical prediction (EP2) used the significant fraud risk factors 
identified in EP1 to develop a model for predicting financial statement fraud.  The study 
used discriminant analysis to test the usefulness of the significant fraud risk factors in 
predicting financial statement fraud.  There are three discriminant analysis methods that 
could be used to perform this test.  The resubstitution method uses the same data both to 
define and to evaluate the classification criterion. Since the resubstitution method tests 
the model with the data used to create the model, it is generally considered to have 
greater bias than other methods.  The second method, cross-validation, which is also 
known as the Lachenbruch or jackknifing method, removes the first observation from the 
data set and finds a discriminant rule using the remaining observations.  The model 
predicts the classification of the removed observation, and then repeats the process for 
each observation.  The resulting number of different classifications can be used to find a 
nearly unbiased estimate of the discriminant rule’s accuracy (Neter et al. 1996).  
According to Neter et al. (1996), if given a choice between these two methods, cross-
validation should be used since it generally provides results that are less biased.  The best 
method is to use a hold-out or split sample to test the discriminant rule.  Due to the 
limited number of fraud firms, this option is not feasible.
Therefore, Table 12 presents both the resubstitution and cross-validation results. 
Using the resubstitution method, fraudulent firms were misclassified as nonfraudulent 
between 23.26 and 43.02 percent of the time.  These results are strong inasmuch as 
studies that have used the resubstitution approach and focused on financial ratios 
generally have misclassification errors greater than 70 percent (Kaminski et al. 2004).  
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However, the resubstitution results were presented only for comparison, considering they 
provide a model with greater potential bias.  The results from the cross-validation method 
are discussed below.  
By using the cross-validation method, the fraud firms were misclassified as non-
fraudulent between 34.88 and 44.19 percent of the time. Once again, these results provide 
much stronger results than other fraud detection or prediction studies that used cross-
validation, which generally have misclassification greater than 50 percent (Kaminski et 
al. 2004).  This model has a larger misclassification of non-fraudulent firms as fraud 
firms than other studies, misclassifying approximately 28 percent of these firms as 
compared to as low as 14 percent in other studies.  Interestingly, the overall 
misclassification error is as low as 31.4 percent in this study compared to 46 percent in 
fraud detection studies focusing on financial ratios.  These results provided empirical 
evidence of the ability or usefulness of the fraud risk factors to detect and/or predict 
fraudulent financial reporting.  These results support SAS No. 99’s assertion that not all of 
the fraud triangle risk factor categories need to be present for fraud to occur.
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TABLE 12
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS
Fraud Prediction Model 1:  All variables
FRAUDi =  + 1COMPMARGi + 2NICFOTAi + 3SGROWi + 4SGROWAi + 5AGROWi
+ 6AGROWAi + 7FATAi + 8SALARi + 9SALTAi + 10INVSALi + 11INVCAi + 12FINANCEi
+ 13FREECi  + 14LEVERAGEi + 15LEVi + 16OWNERSHIPi + 175%OWNi  + 18ROAi
+ 19RECEIVABLEi + 20INVENTORYi + 21FOROPSi + 22BOUTi + 23BOUTPi + 24BINi
+ 25BINPi + 26BSIZEi + 27AUDCOMMi + 28AUDCSIZEi + 29NOEXPERTi
+ 30AUDINDEPPi + 31AUDINDNUMi + 32MINMEETi + 33AUDMEETi + 34INTAUDi
+ 35BLOCKi + 36TOTALTURNi + 37CEOTURNi + 38CEOCHAIRi + 39AUDCHANGi
+ 40AUDREPORTi + 41TATAi + i
Resubstitution Method Cross-validation Method
Model No Fraud % Fraud % Total Error No Fraud % Fraud % Total Error
All variables
No Fraud 81.40 18.60 20.93 65.12 34.88 39.53
Fraud 23.26 76.74 44.19 55.81
Fraud Prediction Model 2:  Removed correlated variables above 80 percent
FRAUDi =  + 1COMPMARGi + 2NICFOTAi + 3SGROWi + 4AGROWAi + 5FATAi + 6SALARi
+ 7SALTAi + 8INVSALi + 9INVCAi + 10FINANCEi + 11FREECi + 12LEVERAGEi
+ 13LEVi + 14OWNERSHIPi + 155%OWNi + 16ROAi + 17RECEIVABLEi
+ 18INVENTORYi + 19FOROPSi + 20BOUTi + 21BOUTPi + 22BINi + 23AUDCOMMi
+ 24NOEXPERTi + 25AUDINDEPPi + 26AUDINDNUMi + 27MINMEETi + 28AUDMEETi
+ 29INTAUDi + 30BLOCKi + 31TOTALTURNi + 32CEOTURNi + 33CEOCHAIRi
+ 34AUDCHANGi + 35AUDREPORTi + 36TATAi + i
Resubstitution Method Cross-validation Method
Model No Fraud % Fraud % Total Error No Fraud % Fraud % Total Error
Removed high correlation variables
No Fraud 77.91 22.09 22.76 66.28 33.72 36.63
Fraud 23.26 76.74 39.53 60.47
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TABLE 12 (CONTINUED)
Fraud Prediction Model 3:  Significant variables from descriptive statistics (Table 6)
FRAUDi =  + 1NICFOTAi + 2AGROWi + 3AGROWAi + 4SALARi + 5SALTAi + 6FREECi
+ 75%OWNi + 8BOUTi + 9BOUTPi + 10BSIZEi + 11AUDCOMMi + 12AUDINDEPPi
+ 13AUDINDNUMi + i
Resubstitution Method Cross-validation Method
Model No Fraud % Fraud % Total Error No Fraud % Fraud % Total Error
Descriptive 10% significance
No Fraud 72.09 27.91 33.72 68.60 31.40 37.21
Fraud 39.53 60.47 43.02 56.98
Fraud Prediction Model 4:  Significant variables from logit regression (Table 7)
FRAUDi =  + 1NICFOTAi + 2OWNERSHIPi + 35%OWNi + 4ROAi + 5RECEIVABLEi + i
Resubstitution Method Cross-validation Method
Model No Fraud % Fraud % Total Error No Fraud % Fraud % Total Error
Logit 10% significance (high correlations removed)
No Fraud 75.58 24.42 29.65 72.09 27.91 33.14
Fraud 34.88 65.12 38.37 61.63
Fraud Prediction Model 5:  Significant variables from logit regression using only 
significant descriptive statistics (Table 8)
FRAUDi =  + 1FREECi + 25%OWNi + 3AUDINDEPPi + i
Resubstitution Method Cross-validation Method
Model No Fraud % Fraud % Total Error No Fraud % Fraud % Total Error
Logit using only descriptive 10% significance
No Fraud 69.77 30.23 36.63 67.44 32.56 38.37
Fraud 43.02 56.98 44.19 55.81
Fraud Prediction Model 6:  Significant variables from stepwise logit regression (Table 9)
FRAUDi =  + 1OWNERSHIPi + 25%OWNi + 3AUDINDEPPi + 4CEOCHAIRi +  i
Resubstitution Method Cross-validation Method
Model No Fraud % Fraud % Total Error No Fraud % Fraud % Total Error
Stepwise Logit 10% significance (high correlations removed)
No Fraud 73.26 26.74 29.65 72.09 27.91 31.40
Fraud 32.56 67.44 34.88 65.12
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TABLE 12 (CONTINUED)
Fraud Prediction Model 7:  Significant variables from stepwise logit regression using 
only significant descriptive statistics (Table 10)
FRAUDi =  + 1AGROWAi + 2SALTAi + 3FREECi + 45%OWNi + 5BOUTi + 6AUDINDEPPi + i
Resubstitution Method Cross-validation Method
Model No Fraud % Fraud % Total Error No Fraud % Fraud % Total Error
Stepwise Logit using only descriptive 10% significance
No Fraud 67.44 32.56 34.88 66.28 33.72 36.63
Fraud 37.21 62.79 39.53 60.47
Fraud Prediction Model 8:  Significant variables from descriptive statistics, logit, and 
stepwise logit (summarized in Table 11)
FRAUDi =  + 1NICFOTAi + 2AGROWi + 3AGROWAi + 4SALARi + 5SALTAi + 6FREECi
+ 7OWNERSHIPi + 85%OWNi + 9ROAi + 10RECEIVABLEi + 11BOUTi + 12BOUTPi
+ 13BSIZEi + 14AUDCOMMi + 15AUDINDEPPi + 16AUDINDNUMi + 17CEOCHAIRi + i
Resubstitution Method Cross-validation Method
Model No Fraud % Fraud % Total Error No Fraud % Fraud % Total Error
10% Significant variables all models
No Fraud 74.42 25.58 26.16 69.77 30.23 34.88
Fraud 26.74 73.26 39.53 60.47
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Sensitivity Analysis
The results from the univariate and logistic analysis applied to test EP1 identified 
multiple variables that potentially have discriminatory value.  Using these significant 
variables to test EP2 resulted in four variables providing the greatest discriminatory 
ability in classifying firms as fraud firms correctly.  These variables are AUDINDEPP, 
5%0WN, OWNERSHIP, and CEOCHAIR.  To test the sensitivity of these results, the 
probability of a firm being in the fraud group based on the proportion of AUDINDEPP, 
5%0WN, OWNERSHIP, and CEOCHAIR was derived.  For each variable’s proportional 
relationship to the probability of being in the fraud group, the other variables in the model 
are held at their mean.   
Figures 8 through 11 report the probability of a firm being in the fraud group 
based upon independent changes in the proportion of the variable, while holding the 
remaining variables at their mean.  These results reveal the power and importance of each 
of these variables in predicting the probability of fraud.
The results in Figure 8 reveal that when the proportion of independent audit 
committee directors (AUDINDEPP) is approximately 12 percent of the audit committee, 
the probability of a firm being in the fraud group is approximately 73 percent.  When the 
proportion of AUDINDEPP is 25 percent of the audit committee, the probability of a firm 
being in the fraud group is approximately 67 percent.  When the proportion increases to 
the mean value of approximately 78 percent, the probability of being in the fraud group 
decreases to 40 percent.  Lastly, as AUDINDEPP increases to 100  percent, the probability 
of being in the fraud group decreases to 30 percent.  These results reveal that as the 
proportion of independent audit committee directors is increased, the probability of 
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financial statement fraud is reduced. These results are consistent with Robinson (2002) 
and mandated changes to audit committee composition (i.e., Sarbanes-Oxley). 
FIGURE 8
EFFECT OF INDEPENDENT AUDIT COMMITTEE DIRECTORS ON THE 
PROBABILITY OF BEING IN THE FRAUD GROUP
Effect of Independence of Audit Committee Directors 
on the Probability of Being in the Fraud Group
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The results in Figure 9 indicate that when the proportion of ownership held by 
management who hold greater than 5 percent of the outstanding shares (5%OWN) 
increases, the probability of fraud increases.  When 5%OWN is approximately 12 percent
of the firm’s outstanding shares, the probability of a firm being in the fraud group is 55
percent.  When the proportion increases to the mean value of approximately 26 percent of 
firm ownership, the probability of being in the fraud group increases to 70 percent.  And 
as 5%OWN increases to 75 percent, the probability of being in the fraud group increases 
to 96 percent.  These results reveal that a curvilinear relationship exists between the 
probability of a firm being in the fraud group and the proportion of management 
ownership greater than 5 percent.  See Figure 9 below.
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FIGURE 9
EFFECT OF 5% OWNERSHIP ON THE PROBABILITY OF 
BEING IN THE FRAUD GROUP
Effect of Management Ownership (5%OWN ) on 
Probability of Being in the Fraud Group
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The results in Figure 10 indicate that when the proportion of insider ownership 
(management and directors) decreases, the probability of being in the fraud group 
increases. When insider ownership (OWNERSHIP) is equal to 75 percent ownership of 
the firm’s outstanding shares, the probability of being in the fraud is 4 percent.  When 
OWNERSHIP decreases to its mean value of approximately 21 percent, the probability of 
fraud increases to 23 percent.  This analysis reveals a strong relationship between the 
probability of being in the fraud group and insider ownership.
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FIGURE 10
EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP ON THE PROBABILITY OF 
BEING IN THE FRAUD GROUP
Effect of Insider Ownership (OWNERSHIP ) on 
Probability of Being in the Fraud Group
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The Figure 11 results indicate that the relationship between CEOs who hold the 
CEO position and both the CEO and Chairman of the Board positions (CEOCHAIR) is 
correlated with a higher probability of being included in the fraud group.  When the CEO 
holds the Chairman of the Board position (CEOCHAIR equals one), the probability of 
being in the fraud group is 47 percent; otherwise (CEO does not hold Chairman of the 
Board title, CEOCHAIR equals zero) the probability of being in the fraud group is 30
percent.  This result reveals the power that an individual who holds both the CEO and 
Chairman of the Board positions may have.  As CEOs accumulate positions/titles, they 
are eliminating individuals who could potentially contend with them.  This potentially 
eliminates a check or balance among the executives.
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FIGURE 11
EFFECT OF CEO/CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD POSITIONS 
HELD BY THE SAME INDIVIDUAL ON THE PROBABILITY OF 
BEING IN THE FRAUD GROUP
Effect of CEO and Chairman of the Board Position 
being held by the same Individual (CEOCHAIR ) on the 
Probability of Being in the Fraud Group
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Implications
The above analysis demonstrates that the fraud risk factors are useful in 
identifying fraud firms.  In particular, three pressure fraud risk factors and one 
opportunity fraud risk factor were found to be useful in classifying firms as either fraud 
or no-fraud firms.  These variables are AUDINDEPP, 5%0WN, OWNERSHIP, and 
CEOCHAIR.  Specific implications relating to the significant fraud risk factors follow.
The results reveal that as the percentage of independent audit committee members 
increases, the likelihood of fraudulent financial statements decreases.  This result 
supports recent legislation (Sarbanes-Oxley) that has mandated an independent audit 
committee.   However, research needs to be done on how independence is defined and 
how this study’s definition of audit committee independence may affect fraud research.
When firms have high management ownership (5%0WN), high insider ownership 
(OWNERSHIP), and/or a CEO who holds the Chairman of the Board position 
(CEOCHAIR), the likelihood of fraud increases.  This implies that firms that have a 
concentration of power should be carefully scrutinized by parties of interest.  Further, 
legislation may be needed to prevent the CEO from holding the chairman of the board 
position to limit the power of individuals.
These results imply that SAS No. 99 is correct in its usage of Cressey’s Fraud 
Triangle.  Furthermore, SAS No. 99 suggests that if any of the fraud triangle elements are 
present, then the likelihood of fraud increases.  This study was only able to identify two 
elements of the fraud triangle that differed among fraud and no-fraud firms.  This finding 
appears to support SAS No. 99’s assertion that not all elements of the fraud triangle need 
to be present for fraud to occur.  It also supports SAS No. 99’s assertion that 
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rationalization is difficult to observe.  Future studies should choose or seek to identify 
alternative proxies for rationalization.  
According to this study’s findings, standard setters, stockholders, investors, 
academics, and any other users of publicly available information should take additional 
precautions when companies have audit committees with a low percentage of outside 
directors, high management ownership exceeding 5 percent, high cumulative percentage 
ownership in the firm held by insiders, or a CEO who holds both the CEO and Chairman 
of the Board position.  The remaining chapter discusses the results and limitations of this 
study.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, LIMITATIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS 
Summary
Much attention has recently been focused on fraud committed by business 
executives and on the accounting firms that failed to detect and report financial statement 
fraud.  This failure has resulted in a loss of public confidence in audited financial 
statements and created an environment where users of financial statements are 
questioning the procedures utilized to detect financial statement fraud.
Prior to the recent accounting scandals, the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants’ (AICPA) Fraud Task Force directed the Accounting Standards Board 
(ASB) to consider revising Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 82, “Consideration 
of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit.”  This was based on academic research, 
recommendations from the accounting profession, and recommendations provided by 
other financial reporting stakeholders.  This process, as well as other pressures, resulted 
in the issuance of SAS No. 99, “Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit” 
(which supersedes SAS No. 82).  While the auditor’s responsibility for detecting fraud 
remains unchanged, SAS No. 99 is intended to focus auditing guidance and thus increase 
auditor effectiveness in detecting fraud. 
SAS No. 99 was intended to serve as the cornerstone of the ASB’s anti-fraud 
program.  It was enhances the accounting profession's most decisive steps in combating
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fraud.  The standard was intended to result in a greater emphasis on professional 
skepticism, a partner-led discussion of fraud assessment with all of the members of the
audit engagement team as part of the planning process, and additional procedures to 
obtain information needed to identify the risks of material misstatement due to fraud, 
including inquiries of management and others, and analytical procedures.
This study focused specifically on the SAS No. 99 processes wherein the auditor 
1) gathers information needed to identify risks of material misstatement, 2) assesses these 
risks after taking into account an evaluation of the entity’s programs and controls, and 3) 
responds to the results. Under SAS No. 99, the auditor must gather and consider much 
more information to assess fraud risks than in the past (Ramos 2003).  This process 
involves gathering information and assessing firms’ fraud risk factors.
The theory behind the SAS No. 99 fraud risk factors was developed by Donald R. 
Cressey in the late 1940s.  Cressey surmised that three conditions are present when fraud 
occurs: 
1. Pressure – management or other employees may have an incentive or be under 
pressure, which provides a motivation to commit fraud.
2. Opportunity – circumstances exist (i.e., the absence of controls, ineffective 
controls, or the ability of management to override controls) that provide an 
opportunity for fraud to be perpetrated. 
3. Rationalization – those involved in a fraud rationalize a fraudulent act as 
being consistent with their personal code of ethics.  Some individuals possess 
an attitude, a character, and/or a set of ethical values that allow them to 
knowingly and intentionally commit a dishonest act (Ramos 2003). 
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This study empirically examined the fraud risk factors adopted by the Accounting 
Standards Board in SAS No. 99 and developed a model that is useful in discriminating 
between fraud and no-fraud firms.  A cross-sectional logistic regression analysis of 
matched sample firms was used to evaluate the usefulness of the fraud risk factors.  In 
addition, differences between fraud risk factor means were compared between fraud and 
no-fraud firms.  The result was to identify fraud risk factors that are useful in 
discriminating fraud and no-fraud firms.  This phase of testing involved identifying and 
testing proxies for pressure, opportunity, and rationalization.  The identified proxies were 
examined for a sample of firms that have been convicted of fraud and compared with a 
sample of no-fraud firms.  This phase identified several pressure and opportunity fraud 
risk factors that may be useful in discriminating between fraud and no-fraud firms.  These 
variables included 5%OWN, AUDINDEPP, FREEC, CEOCHAIR, NICFOTA, 
OWNERSHIP, FINANCE, and ROA.
After identifying the significant fraud risk factors from the logistic and means 
analyses, the study applied multiple discriminate analysis to the significant variables to 
develop a prediction model.  This phase of the study followed the theory developed in the 
bankruptcy prediction studies (initiated by Altman 1968).  This phase involved using the 
empirically relevant fraud risk factors identified in the first phase to develop a fraud 
prediction model.  As shown in Table 12, the fraud prediction model that performed best 
used the significant variables identified in the stepwise regression logit model.  These 
variables included 5%0WN, OWNERSHIP, CEOCHAIR, and AUDINDEPP.  These 
variables represent only two legs of the fraud triangle.  The first three fraud risk factors 
are proxies for pressure, while the last fraud risk factor proxies for opportunity.  
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It is interesting that none of the fraud risk factor proxies for rationalization were 
significantly different among fraud and no-fraud firms.  This may indicate that better 
proxies for rationalization need to be identified or that pressure and opportunity are the 
only two variables that must be present for fraud to occur.  This is in line with SAS No. 
99’s assertion that if any fraud risk factors are present, greater attention should be given 
to that firm.
The prediction model is able to correctly classify fraud firms 72 percent of the 
time.  This finding is very important as Kuruppu et al. (2003) noted that the Altman 
bankruptcy model, when applied to matched samples such as this study, only has an 
accuracy rate of between 40 and 50 percent.  This shows that the fraud risk factor model 
is a stronger analytical tool at identifying fraud firms.  Additionally, studies that have 
expanded the financial ratios used by Altman (1969), such as Persons (1995) and 
Kaminski et al. (2004), have only correctly identified fraud firms in the year prior to the 
fraud 20 to 40 percent of the time.  
In addition to a higher identification rate of fraud firms, the fraud risk factor 
model developed in this study is more accurate in correctly identifying no-fraud firms.  
The overall effect is that the fraud risk factor has a lower misclassification error of fraud 
and no-fraud firms than the other prediction models.  Given the high costs associated 
with misclassifying fraudulent firms, the need or demand for an accurate analytical model 
for identifying fraudulent firms is immense.  The developed fraud prediction model can 
be used as a valuable analytical tool in evaluating and identifying fraudulent firms.  Most 
importantly this study used publicly available data, thus allowing private investors who 
are not privy to proprietary information to assess the likelihood of a firm issuing 
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fraudulent financial statements.  Further, the use of Cressey’s theory in the development 
of the SAS No. 99 fraud risk factors appears to be substantiated by these results.
The results of this study provide evidence of the usefulness of the SAS No. 99
fraud risk factors and support the use of Cressey’s fraud triangle.  This evidence should 
be of interest to regulators, standard setters, investors, academics, and the accounting 
profession as they further define and refine analytical procedures and methods for 
identifying fraudulent firms.
The results of this study are of interest to academics, standard setters, and users of 
financial statement data.  The results show that Cressey’s theory is at least in part correct 
and can be used in developing proxies for fraud risk factors.  This is important in light of 
the ASB using the fraud triangle theory in SAS No. 99.  The development of the fraud 
prediction model based upon the fraud triangle is of interest to academics, standard 
setters, and users of financial statement data since the model permits the use of publicly 
available data (unlike the proprietary data that auditors and other insiders may have 
access to) to assess the likelihood that a firm will be involved in the preparation of 
fraudulent financial statements (similar to Altman’s Z-score [1968]).
Limitations
As with most fraud studies, a limitation of the sample selection process involved 
the potential misclassification of no-fraud firms.  This misclassification results from the 
possibility that financial statement fraud might have occurred but has yet to be detected 
and subjected to SEC investigation.  This results in a dichotomous dependent variable for 
fraud.  All cases of financial statement fraud are in publicly traded companies, where the 
supporting financial and proxy statements are available.
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Another limitation resulted in the operationalization of the SAS No. 99 fraud risk 
factors.  The proxies for the fraud risk factors may not be truly measuring the fraud risk 
factor or there may be stronger unidentified proxies for the fraud risk factors.  This is 
particularly evident in that none of the proxies for rationalization were significantly 
different among fraud and no-fraud firms.
The significant findings for audit committee independence support the 
suggestions made by the Blue Ribbon Committee and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; 
however, with the advent of Sarbanes-Oxley this measure, as currently defined, may have 
lost its predictive ability and a new measure may need to be developed.
Suggestions for Future Research
This study extends the previous literature of financial statement fraud by 
examining the SAS No. 99 fraud risk factors that are modeled after Cressey’s fraud 
triangle.  In addition, the study extends the research by developing a discriminatory 
model using the fraud risk factors to discriminate between fraud and no-fraud firms.  
However, many interesting questions could be examined by future research.  Listed 
below are possible future research avenues.
SAS No. 99 identifies two types of fraud: financial statement fraud and asset 
misappropriation.  Future research could focus on developing a model to identify firms 
with asset misappropriation based on the SAS No. 99 fraud risk factors.  Similar work has 
been done relating to SAS No. 82 but has yet to be tied to Cressey’s fraud triangle. 
This study identified several fraud risk factors recognized in the literature as 
having discriminatory value, yet they were not useful in discriminating between fraud 
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and no-fraud firms.   It may be interesting to see if any of these variables are useful in 
discriminating between firms with asset misappropriation and no-misappropriation.
While this study has stronger results than other prediction studies using MDA 
and/or ratio analysis, there remains the potential to identify stronger proxies for the fraud 
risk factors and to develop a stronger model for detecting financial statement fraud. 
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APPENDIX
LIST OF FRAUD AND MATCHED NO-FRAUD FIRMS
Initial 
Fraud 
Year # Fraud Firm Matched Firm (No-Fraud)
1992 1 AMP INC MOLEX INC
1992 2 COLLINS INDUSTRIES INC SUPREME INDS INC
1992 3 DIAGNOSTEK INC LILLIAN VERNON CORP
1992 4 GRACE (W R) & CO AIR PRODUCTS & CHEMICALS IN
1992 5 JO-ANN STORES INC HOUSE OF FABRICS INC
1992 6 KENDALL SQUARE RESH CORP/DE CYCOMM INTERNATIONAL INC
1992 7 RANDOM ACCESS INC PEAK TECHNOLOGIES GRP
1992 8 STRUCTURAL DYMICS RESEARCH ELECTRONIC ARTS INC
1993 9 CYPRESS BIOSCIENCE INC (aka IMRE Corp) LIPOSOME COMPANY INC
1993 10 FASTCOMM COMMUNICATIONS CORP CASCADE COMMUNICATIONS CORP
1993 11 NORTHSTAR HEALTH SVCS INC CLINICORP INC
1993 12 PINNACLE MICRO INC CAMBEX CORP
1993 13 T2 MEDICAL INC ABBEY HEALTHCARE GROUP INC
1994 14 ABS INDUSTRIES INC AMPCO-PITTSBURGH CORP
1994 15 CALIFORNIA MICRO DEVICES CP EA INDUSTRIES INC
1994 16 CENTENNIAL TECHNOLOGIES INC VOICE CONTROL SYSTEMS INC
1994 17 DONNKENNY INC DANSKIN INC
1994 18 KNOWLEDGEWARE INC  -CL A BOOLE & BABBAGE INC
1994 19 MICRO WAREHOUSE INC EGGHEAD.COM INC-OLD
1994 20 MIDISOFT CORP MERIDIAN DATA INC
1994 21 SUNRISE MEDICAL INC MINE SAFETY APPLIANCES CO
1994 22 SYSTEM SOFTWARE ASSOC INC COMPUWARE CORP
1995 23 IGI INC PDK LABS INC
1995 24 MATERIAL SCIENCES CORP BMC INDUSTRIES INC/MN
1995 25 OAK INDUSTRIES INC METHODE ELECTRONICS  -CL A
1995 26 THOR INDUSTRIES INC ARCTIC CAT INC
1996 27 CEC INDUSTRIES CORP MERITAGE CORP
1996 28 FINE HOST CORP TACO CABANA  -CL A
1996 29 INAMED CORP STERIS CORP
1996 30 LERNOUT & HAUSPIE SPEECH PD EXPERT SOFTWARE INC
1996 31 PHYSICIAN COMPUTER NETWK INC CERPLEX GROUP INC
1996 32 SIGNAL TECHNOLOGY CORP KEITHLEY INSTR INC
1996 33 SUNBEAM CORPORATION PILLOWTEX CORP
1996 34 UNISON HEALTHCARE CORP RETIREMENT CARE ASSOC INC
1997 35 ACCELR8 TECHNOLOGY CORP BRILLIANT DIGITAL ENTMT INC
1997 36 AURA SYSTEMS INC FIREARMS TRAINING SYS  -CL A
1997 37 CANDIE S INC WALKER (B.B.) CO
1997 38 CYBERGUARD CORP PUMATECH INC
1997 39 ENRON CORP ADAMS RESOURCES & ENERGY IN
1997 40 GUILFORD MILLS INC ITHACA INDUSTRIES INC
1997 41 HBO & CO REYNOLDS & REYNOLDS  -CL A
1997 42 HYBRID NETWORKS INC TRICORD SYSTEMS INC
1997 43 INTL THOROUGHBRED BREEDERS FAMILY GOLF CENTERS INC
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1997 44 JUST FOR FEET INC SHOE CARNIVAL INC
1997 45 PREMIER LASER SYS  -CL A UROLOGIX INC
1997 46 SAF T LOK INC QEP CO INC
1997 47 WIZ TECHNOLOGY INC DIGITAL RIVER INC
1997 48 XEROX CORP LEXMARK INTL INC  -CL A
1998 49 ANICOM INC WIRELESS XCESSORIES GRP INC
1998 50 AURORA FOODS INC DEL MONTE FOODS CO
1998 51 BRIGHTPOINT INC MARSHALL INDUSTRIES
1998 52 CYLINK CORP MEDIA 100 INC
1998 53 FIRST VIRTUAL COMMUNICATIONS KOFAX IMAGE PRODUCTS INC
1998 54 FLIR SYSTEMS INC DRS TECHNOLOGIES INC
1998 55 LASON INC BLACK BOX CORP
1998 56 MICROSTRATEGY INC ENGINEERING ANIMATION INC
1998 57 RITE AID CORP CVS CORP
1998 58 SABRATEK CORP THERMO CARDIOSYSTEMS
1998 59 SPORT-HALEY INC PREMIUMWEAR INC
1998 60 SYMBOL TECHNOLOGIES CREATIVE TECHNOLOGY LTD
1998 61 THOMAS & BETTS CORP RAYCHEM CORP
1998 62 US TECHNOLOGIES INC NATIONAL MFG TECHNOLOGIES
1999 63 ANDRX CORP SYNCOR INTL CORP/DE
1999 64 AREMISSOFT CORP/DE METASOLV INC
1999 65 ENGINEERING ANIMATION INC INFORMATION ADVNTGE SOFTWARE
1999 66 GEMSTAR-TV GUIDE INTL INC MARTHA STEWART LIVING OMNIM
1999 67 HEALTHSOUTH CORP CONCENTRA OPERATING CORP
1999 68 INDUS INTERTIOL INC MANUGISTICS GROUP INC
1999 69 LEGATO SYSTEMS INC REMEDY CORP
1999 70 PEREGRINE SYSTEMS INC GENESYS TELECOMM LABS INC
1999 71 RENT WAY INC PREMIUMWEAR INC
1999 72 SCHICK TECHNOLOGIES INC AMERICAN SCIENCE ENGINEERING
1999 73 TENFOLD CORP MICRO GENERAL CORP
1999 74 TRUMP HOTEL&CASINO RESRT INC MANDALAY RESORT GROUP
1999 75 UNIFY CORP ON TECHNOLOGY CORP
2000 76 800 AMERICA.COM INC VICINITY CORP
2000 77 ASHFORD.COM INC GEERLINGS & WADE INC
2000 78 CRITICAL PATH INC LUMINANT WORLDWIDE CORP
2000 79 CUTTER & BUCK INC ASHWORTH INC
2000 80 GATEWAY INC APPLE COMPUTER INC
2000 81 MAX INTERNET COMM INC WAVE SYSTEMS CORP  -CL A
2000 82 NESCO INC STERLING CONSTRUCTION CO INC
2001 83 DYNEGY INC OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORP
2001 84 HOMESTORE INC SRA INTERNATIONAL INC
2001 85 KMART HOLDING CORP TARGET CORP
2001 86 RSA SECURITY INC KRONOS INC
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